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Abstract
Reclassification risk is a major concern in health insurance where contracts are
typically one year in length but health shocks often persist for much longer. We theoret-
ically characterize optimal long-term insurance contracts with one-sided commitment,
and use our characterization to provide a simple computation algorithm for computing
optimal contracts from primitives. We apply this method to derive empirically-based
optimal long-term health insurance contracts using all-payers claims data from Utah,
and then evaluate the potential welfare performance of these contracts. We find that
optimal long-term health insurance contracts that start at age 25 can eliminate over
94% of the welfare loss from reclassification risk for individuals who arrive on the mar-
ket in good health, but are of little benefit to the worst age-25 health risks. As a result,
their ex ante value depends significantly on whether pre-age-25 health risk is otherwise
insured. Their value also depends on individuals’ expected income growth.
1 Introduction
Consumers face substantial health risks over their lifetimes. Much of this risk involves
conditions, such as diabetes, heart disease, and cancer, that lead to high expected medical
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expenses over significant periods of time. These conditions can expose individuals who buy
short-term insurance coverage to substantial premium increases — so-called “reclassification
risk” — greatly reducing the extent to which their health risks are insured.
Concerns over reclassification risk have received a great deal of public and academic atten-
tion in recent years. Markets characterized by managed competition, such as the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) exchanges in the U.S. and nationwide exchanges in the Netherlands and
Switzerland, were designed to contend with this problem through community rating and
guaranteed issuance, thereby prohibiting discrimination against consumers who have devel-
oped pre-existing conditions. Unfortunately, while requiring identical pricing for consumers
with different health can eliminate reclassification risk, it can also create adverse selection,
leading to under-provision of insurance or a need for myriad additional regulations to combat
that selection [Handel, Hendel and Whinston (2015), Patel and Pauly (2002)].
In this paper we explore an alternative approach: long-term contracts without pricing
regulation. By specifying long-term obligations, such contracts can mitigate reclassification
risk without causing the adverse selection that forced community rating creates. Long-term
insurance contracts are common in other areas of insurance, such as life insurance [Hendel
and Lizzeri (2003)]. In the U.S. prior to the ACA, state-level guaranteed renewability
regulations introduced some elements of dynamic contracting to health insurance contracts,
albeit of a restricted form [Patel and Pauly (2002), Marquis and Buntin (2006)]. Outside
of the U.S., both Germany and Chile have some long-term contracting for health insurance
[Browne and Hoffman (2013), Atal (2016), Atal et al. (2019)].
We make two contributions toward understanding the performance of such contracts.
First, we develop a dynamic model of health insurance contracting and characterize optimal
long-term insurance contracts. Our characterization also, importantly, enables a simple
method for computing optimal contracts given primitives such as the stochastic health
process and the growth of a consumer’s income with age.
Second, with this theorem and computational method in hand, we derive empirically-
based optimal contracts and analyze the welfare gains that such contracts can deliver. We
perform this empirical exercise using rich all-payer claims data from the state of Utah,
comparing the welfare that might be achieved for Utah consumers using optimal dynamic
contracts both to spot contracting and to a managed competition-style insurance exchange.
We begin our analysis in Section 2 by characterizing optimal long-term health insurance
contracts theoretically. Forward-looking insurees, who face changing health conditions over
their lifetimes, purchase insurance from competitive forward-looking firms. If only spot
contracts are available, risk-averse consumers are able to fully insure within-period risk but
premiums reflect the information revealed over time, implying that consumers fully bear the
risk of persistent health shocks. If both consumers and firms could commit to long-term
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contracts ex ante, prior to information revelation, then the efficient (first-best) allocation of
full long-run insurance is possible. Since it is generally acknowledged that consumers cannot
be bound to long-term insurance contracts, we focus instead on contracts with one-sided
commitment, in which firms but not consumers can make long-term contractual promises.1
In the model, consumers seek to insure against negative health shocks over their lifetimes.
Consumers and insurers learn about these shocks symmetrically over time. We assume that
there are capital market imperfections that prevent consumers from borrowing sufficient
funds to pay for a first-best lifetime insurance contract up front.2
In this setting, the competitive equilibrium in markets with one-sided commitment only
partially insures reclassification risk. We show theoretically that an optimal dynamic con-
tract initially offers a consumer a minimum guaranteed consumption level. Dynamically, this
minimal guarantee is bumped up to “match the market” when a consumer has unexpectedly
good health realizations (which can involve remaining healthy longer than expected as the
consumer ages), in order to ensure that consumers won’t leave the long-term contract. The
optimal contracts involve “front-loading” (premiums in excess of expected medical costs) to
lock consumers partially into the contract and allow insurers to both break even and offer
insurance against reclassification risk.
The optimal consumption guarantee depends on the stochastic health process, the con-
sumer’s income path over time (i.e., how much income rises with age), and the interest rate,
but somewhat surprisingly, we show that it does not depend on the consumer’s level of risk
aversion. We also show that these optimal contracts equivalently can be offered as guaran-
teed premium path contracts, which simply promise a fixed path of annual premiums, and
that, when they are offered in this form, they are self-selective in the sense that consumers
with different lifetime income profiles and risk preferences will choose the contracts designed
for them from a menu of optimal contracts, even if firms do not observe this information
about individual consumers.3 We also incorporate consumer switching costs, which have
been shown to be important in consumer health insurance choices [Handel (2013)].
Our theoretical analysis also enables easy computation of the optimal dynamic contract
given a consumer’s stochastic health process, income path, and the interest rate, which
is critical for our aim of evaluating the welfare gains that such contracts can provide. In
1See, for example, the discussions in Diamond (1992), Cochrane (1995), and Pauly, Kunreuther, and
Hirth (1995).
2A large literature examining the life-cycle consumption theory documents the importance of credit
constraints faced by consumers, particularly young consumers [Attanasio and Weber (2010), Japelli and
Pistaferri (2010)]. In practice, some of these capital market imperfections likely stem from similar factors to
those that prevent consumers from committing to make large ex post payments to an insurer.
3This form of contract is widely used “Annual Renewable Term” contracts in the life insurance market
(see Hendel and Lizzeri (2003)) and is also observed in the German health insurance market (Browne and
Hoffmann (2013)).
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principle, an optimal dynamic contract could be an extremely complicated object, specifying
consumption levels along any possible health history, potentially making the computation
of an optimal contract an intractable problem. However, as we discuss in Section 2, our
theoretical analysis yields two extremely useful properties of optimal contracts that enables
a simple computational procedure.
With these theoretical results in hand, in Section 3 we turn to deriving the primitives
needed to implement our model empirically using granular data from the Utah all-payer
claims database, which contains individual-level diagnostic and spending information on all
privately insured consumers in the state of Utah (~2 million consumers). For each consumer
and each year they are in the data, we use their medical diagnostic codes and spending data
to estimate a health index that predicts their medical spending for the upcoming year. We
estimate a second-order Markov process that captures the empirical evolution of consumer
health. We estimate this Markov process as a function of age and use these estimates to
study the evolution of health risk over the life-cycle, a key ingredient for assessing the welfare
implications of dynamic insurance contracts.
In Section 4, we combine the estimated primitives with our model to compute optimal
dynamic contracts for representative male consumers in Utah. Although this analysis is
necessarily stylized given the institutional intricacies of insurance provision in the U.S. (e.g.,
we conduct our analysis for several typical income paths, don’t consider movement between
an employer insurance sector and the long-term contract, and don’t consider possibilities for
medical expense reductions through uncompensated charitable care or bankruptcy), relative
to prior work it provides empirical insights into the potential benefits and costs of long-term
contracts.
We find that a healthy 25 year old male in Utah with a flat net income profile over
time (“net income” is income minus expected medical costs), pays a premium of $2,294
despite expected costs of only $837 in that year. The extent of contract front-loading is
inverted U-shaped in health status: it is highest for individuals in medium health states
and lower for the healthiest and sickest consumers. This is because the extent of front-
loading at any point in time depends on both a consumer’s current health state and the
implications of that current state for future states. Consumers in worse health benefit more
from the future promises that front-loading buys, but front-loading is more costly for them
because of their high spending needs. In addition to health status, we show that consumers’
expected income profiles play a crucial role in shaping optimal dynamic contracts. When
consumers have steeper increasing income profiles, they are asked to front-load less in the
optimal contract because their marginal value of incremental income is relatively higher
when they are younger. (As we discuss in Section 2, a flatter income profile in our model
may also represent a consumer with greater ability to borrow against future income.) Thus,
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their income growth over time limits their desire to insure future health risks with valuable
current income.
In Section 5 we study the welfare these optimal dynamic contracts generate relative to
alternative insurance system designs.
To better understand the baseline level of potential reclassification risk in our environ-
ment, we first investigate the welfare loss from a market with only year-to-year spot contracts
(and no community rating), relative to the first best. Across a range of income profiles, spot
contracts result in a lifetime welfare loss between 17.8% and 40.6% for consumers who start
their adult lives in good health. Since, for some income paths, the welfare loss induced by
spot contracts comes in part from their inability to smooth consumption over time, we con-
sider as well an alternative benchmark: contracts that offer full insurance but with premiums
at each age equal to the average medical expenses of that age group (“No Borrowing / No
Savings Full Insurance”). Relative to this alternative benchmark, spot contracts still entail
a 9.3% to 17.8% welfare loss for consumers who start in good health, representing the loss
from not being able to insure reclassification risk.
Turning to dynamic contracts, we first investigate their implications for consumers con-
ditional on their age-25 health state. We find that, for men in Utah who start their adult
lives in good health, optimal dynamic contracts close 95-99% of the welfare gap between
spot contracts and the “No Borrowing / No Savings Full Insurance” benchmark. However,
because of their high initial spending needs, individuals who are in the poorest health state
at age-25 gain much less from dynamic contracts, capturing only 5-29% of this welfare gap.
We also assess the ex ante performance of dynamic contracts by computing the welfare
of unborn individuals who face uncertainty about their age-25 health state. While most
consumers’ benefits from dynamic contracts are similar to those of the healthiest consumers,
the low benefits dynamic contracts provide to the sickest consumers dramatically attenuate
their ex ante benefits. That is, the welfare impact of dynamic contracts on unborn individuals
is heavily influenced by risk aversion about landing in the worst possible health state at age-
25. As a result, for those with flat net income, dynamic contracts close only 43.3% of the
welfare gap, while for those with our steepest income profile optimal dynamic contracts
bridge only 4.6% of the at-birth “ex ante” welfare gap.
These results suggest that insurance for this pre-age-25 health risk would be desirable
in a regime that relied on dynamic health insurance contracts. We find that insuring this
pre-age-25 health risk, so that all consumers have the same lifetime welfare as the healthiest
25 year old, would cost the government between $5,000 and $12,000 per consumer.4 We also
4One can think of this kind of policy to insure age-25 risk as similar in spirit to the risk-adjustment,
risk-corridor, and reinsurance regulations present in the ACA (and many other current environments) but
applied to age-25 consumers choosing dynamic contracts instead of consumers of all ages choosing year-to-
year contracts.
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examine the welfare effect of a balanced budget insurance scheme for pre-age-25 health risk.
With this insurance in place, dynamic contracts close between 79-93% of the ex ante welfare
gap between spot contracts and our “No Borrowing / No Saving” benchmark.
In Section 6, we compare the welfare outcomes under full implementation of dynamic
contracts to those achieved in a managed competition-style exchange, similar in spirit to
an exchange set up under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) or to Medicare Part D. We find
that whether the exchange is preferred from a welfare perspective depends on the income
profiles we consider and whether the government insures pre-age-25 risk under dynamic
contracts. With such insurance in place, for rising income profiles, the managed competition
environment does better than dynamic contracts, but for consumers with flat net income
profiles, dynamic contracts are preferred. Intuitively, the exchange environment is better for
individuals who find front-loading costly. If age-25 health risk is not insured under dynamic
contracts, then consumers prefer the managed competition environment for all income paths.
In Section 7, we explore three extensions. First, we consider the effects of switching costs,
as estimated in Handel (2013). Second, we consider the possibility that, absent a long-term
contract, consumers may engage in precautionary savings to reduce the risk they face. Third,
because of concerns that estimated levels of risk aversion in the health insurance literature
may overstate consumers’ aversion to the much larger risks associated with reclassification
risk, we consider how a lower level of risk aversion would affect our welfare conclusions.
We conclude in Section 8, where we also briefly discuss some of the practical impediments
to the use of dynamic contracts in the US.
Our model and characterization theorem generalizes work on optimal dynamic contracts
by Harris and Holmstrom (1983) and Hendel and Lizzeri (2003). Harris and Holmstrom
(1983) study optimal dynamic labor contracts when risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms
symmetrically learn the level of a worker’s productivity over time. Aside from the difference
in setting from labor markets to health insurance markets, our model allows for much a more
general stochastic process than is present when learning about a worker’s productivity, which
is essential for studying health insurance.5 Nevertheless, the optimality of consumption floors
parallels the downwardly rigid wages found in Harris and Holmstrom (1983). Hendel and
Lizzeri (2003) characterize optimal life insurance contracts in a two-period model. Like our
model, their model allows for general health state transitions, but ours applies for an arbitrary
contract duration, which is needed for our empirical exercise. Neither of these papers has
results on self-selection or switching costs. Perhaps most significantly, neither uses their
theoretical characterization to compute empirically-based optimal dynamic contracts and
assess their welfare performance.
5Our model’s more general stochastic process, and our computational methods, could also enable study
of implicit labor contracts insuring very general forms of productivity shocks.
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Our model of long-term health insurance contracting also relates closely to work by Pauly,
Kunreuther, and Hirth (1995) and Cochrane (1995). Pauly, Kunreuther, and Hirth (1995)
focus on contracts that ensure that an insured can renew future coverage at the same rates
that the healthiest possible type would pay (which they term “guaranteed renewable”), while
Cochrane (1995) proposes the use of “premium insurance” as a means of insuring against
long-term negative shocks to health. In Section 2 and Appendix C, we discuss in depth the
theoretical relation of our optimal contracts to those proposed in these two papers, and assess
the welfare these alternative contracts provide compared to our optimal dynamic contracts.
A number of papers study long-term insurance contracting empirically, although none
of them study welfare: Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) examines the structure of life insurance
contracts and concludes that they display the features of optimal contracts with one-sided
commitment. Finkelstein, McGarry and Sufi (2005) study positive implications of dynamic
contracting in the context of long-term care markets, and show evidence of adverse reten-
tion, namely that healthier consumers lapse from contracts over time, leading to high average
costs from those consumers that remain. Herring and Pauly (2006) conduct an empirical
calibration of the Pauly, Kunreuther and Hirth (1995) model, using data from the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). Browne and Hoffmann (2013) study the German private
health insurance (PHI) market and demonstrate that (i) front-loading of premiums gener-
ates consumer lock-in, (ii) more front-loading is associated with lower lapsation, and (iii)
consumers that lapse are healthier than those who do not. Atal (2016) studies the impact of
lock-in to an insurance plan on the matching between individuals and health care providers
in Chile. Bundorf, Levin, and Mahoney (2012) investigate the implications of reclassifica-
tion risk in a large-employer context in a short-run environment. Lastly, in a recent working
paper, Fleitas, Gowrisankaran, and Losasso (2018) document limited dynamic pass through
of expected medical costs into premiums in the pre-ACA small group market. See Hendel
(2016) for a survey of the literature on reclassification risk.
Compared to this previous empirical work on long-term health insurance contracts, our
paper’s contribution is that it (i) uses granular data on a large population to derive optimal
contracts with one-sided commitment and (ii) studies the welfare implications of such con-
tracts relative to alternative insurance market designs. In this regard, our paper shares a
similar spirit with papers by Farhi andWerning (2013) and Golosov, Troshkin, and Tsyvinski
(2016), who characterize and empirically examine the benefits of optimal long-term insurance
of individual productivity risk in life-cycle models of consumption and labor supply.
Finally, in ongoing work, Atal et al. (2019) apply our framework to study the welfare
levels of long-term health insurance contracts offered in Germany, and Fleitas et al. (2018)
use our analysis to guide their study of small group health insurance market in the US.
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2 Theory
We consider a dynamic insurance problem  periods long, with periods indexed  = 1  .
In our empirical analysis, periods represent years, with  = 1 corresponding to a 25 year old,
and  = 40 corresponding to a 65-year old, when Medicare coverage would begin in the U.S.
The consumer may incur medical expenses  ∈ R in each period , which are uncertain
and motivate the desire for insurance. The consumer enters each period  characterized
by his health status  ∈ , which determines the distribution of that period’s medical
expenses. We take  to be a finite set. In our empirical work, greater  will indicate sicker
individuals, so that expected medical expenses E[|] are strictly increasing in .
The evolution of the consumer’s health status is stochastic, with the probability of health
status +1 given previous health history Λ
1
 ≡ (1  ) given by (+1|Λ1 ). (Conditional
on Λ1 , the realization of +1 may be correlated with the realization of .) We refer to Λ
1
 as
the consumer’s health state at the start of period , and denote the consumer’s initial health
state by Λ11. The probabilities (·) give rise to the probability (Λ+10 |Λ1 ) that any given
continuation path Λ+10 ≡ (+1  0) of health statuses will follow period  starting from
health state Λ1 . In our empirical work, we will suppose that health status transitions are
governed by a second-order Markov process, so that (·) can be written as (+1|−1 ),
but the results in this section hold more generally.
An individual’s health state Λ1 at the start of period  is observed by both the individual
and all insurance firms, namely, there is symmetric information and symmetric learning.6
We assume that the insurance market is perfectly competitive, with risk-neutral firms who
discount future cash flows using the discount factor  ∈ (0 1). A consumer’s risk preferences
are described by (·), the consumer’s Bernoulli utility function, while the consumer’s long-run
expected utility is E[
P
 
()], where  ∈ R is the consumer’s period  consumption level.
Throughout, we assume that 0(·)  0 and that 00(·)  0, which motivates the consumer’s
desire for insurance. The consumer’s income in period  is , and evolves deterministically.
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Throughout we assume that consumers are unable to borrow to fund premium payments
or other expenses. However, in interpreting our later empirical exercise, one can view the
income path  = {}1 as post-borrowing income; so a consumer with a slower growth in 
over time may be a consumer who is more able to borrow.
In what follows, we will sometimes refer to a consumer’s income profile  ≡ (1   )
and risk preferences (·) as the consumer’s “type”  ≡ ( ).
6Our assumption that all insurers have access to the same information assumes that insurers can properly
underwrite new customers. If, instead, an individual’s current insurer had better information than other firms,
prospective insurers would face an adverse selection problem when attempting to attract lapsing consumers.
For the consequences of this type of adverse selection, see, for example, DeGaridel-Thoron (2005).
7The model readily generalizes to stochastic income, possibly dependent on the consumer’s health status.
In this case, the optimal contract would insure both health and income risk.
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2.1 Three Benchmarks
We will compare optimal dynamic contracts with one-sided commitment against three nat-
ural benchmarks.8 The first is the efficient, first-best allocation. In this setting, this outcome
involves a constant consumption in all states and periods, equal to the annualized present
discounted value of the consumer’s “net income” from periods  = 1 to  (where the “net
income” in period  equals period  income, , less the expectation of period  medical
expenses conditional on the consumer’s health state Λ11 at the first period of contracting,







−1( − E[|Λ11]) (1)
As is well known, if consumers and insurance firms could both commit to a long-term contract
given Λ11, the competitive equilibrium would yield this outcome.
At the opposite extreme, long-term contracts may be impossible, leading to single-period
“spot” insurance contracts. In a competitive market, in each period  such contracts will fully
insure the consumer’s within-period medical expense risks at a premium equal to E[|],
the consumer’s expected medical expense given his period  health status . This results in
the period  consumption level −E[|]. Because the consumer’s period  health status 
is ex ante uncertain, this outcome faces the consumer with risk from an ex ante perspective.
Given Λ11, the consumer’s constant certainty equivalent of this uncertain consumption path









−1( − E[|])|Λ11] (2)
Finally, in this dynamic setting both insurance and consumption smoothing over time
are needed to achieve the first best. Since we will focus on settings in which income  is
increasing over time and (additional) borrowing is impossible, another natural benchmark is
the outcome that would result if the consumer was fully insured within each period (elimi-
nating all ex ante risk) but resources could not be transferred over time. This certain but
time-varying consumption path results in the same welfare as the constant consumption level







−1( − E[|Λ11])) (3)
8We also compare the outcome of optimal dynamic contracts with one-sided commitment to a managed
competition-style exchange.
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Compared to spot contracting, this benchmark eliminates reclassification risk without im-
proving intertemporal allocation.
In our empirical work, we will consider both the expected utility that dynamic contracting
and these benchmarks generate at age 25 at the start of contracting (conditional on Λ11), and
also the expected utilities that are implied at birth, factoring in the randomness of the
consumer’s age-25 health state (Λ11).
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2.2 Optimal Dynamic Contracts with One-Sided Commitment:
Structure
We now turn to the setting in which competitive insurers can offer long-term contracts that
they, but not consumers, are committed to. We assume that contracting begins in period 1
(in our empirical setting, at age-25) after Λ11 has been realized. We can view a long-term
contract as specifying the consumer’s consumption in each period , , as a function of the
consumer’s publicly-observed health and medical expense history up to through period 
including period ’s realization of  and +1, [Λ
1
+1 (1 )].
10 The insurer’s profit in
the period then equals the consumer’s income  less the sum of period  medical expenses
and period  consumption. The lack of commitment by the consumer, however, means that
the consumer is free in each period to change to another insurer who is offering the consumer
better terms.
As in Harris and Holmstrom (1982), without loss of generality we can restrict attention
when solving for the optimal contract to contracts in which the consumer never has an
incentive to “lapse” in this way: since the new contract the consumer signs following any
history must give his new insurer a non-negative expected discounted continuation profit, the
consumer’s initial insurer could include the same contract continuation in the initial insurance
contract and weakly increase its expected discounted profit (lapsation would instead yield the
initial insurer a continuation profit of zero). As a result, we can look for an optimal contract
by imposing “lapsation constraints” that require that after no history is it possible to offer
the consumer an alternative continuation contract that (i) itself prevents future lapsation,
9When we examine at-birth welfare levels, we compute ∗ and ∗ from an at-birth perspective,
replacing E[|Λ11] with E[] in (1) and (3). For spot contracting, we calculate the certainty equivalent
annual consumption that generates the same age 25 to 65 welfare as the spot contracting regime, taking
account of any risk aversion losses arising because of uncertainty over the consumer’s age-25 health state, Λ11.
Similarly for the dynamic contracts we discuss in the next subsection, and the managed competition-style
exchange which we examine in Section 6.
10This formulation assumes, for convenience, that the consumer cannot engage in hidden savings. While
we will make this assumption initially, in the end we show that under the optimal contract the consumer
has no desire to save. We could also allow consumption to be stochastic conditional on [Λ1+1 (1 )],
but this will not be optimal.
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(ii) breaks even in expectation, and (iii) gives the consumer a higher continuation utility
than in the original contract.
We take a recursive approach to solving this optimal contracting problem. At each date
, we can think of the state as a pair (Λ1  ) where Λ
1
 is the consumer’s current health
state (which determines future expected medical expenses), and  is the absolute value of
the loss that the insurer is allowed to sustain going forward (i.e.,  is the subsidy for future
insurance).11 This is a useful formulation for two reasons. First, after any history Λ1 leading
up to period , continuation of the original contract generates some expected utility to the
consumer and some expected loss  to the insurer. A necessary condition for an optimal
contract, given the consumer’s current health state, is that it is not possible to increase
the consumers’ continuation utility while keeping the insurer’s loss equal to . So, the
continuation of the contract must itself solve an optimal contracting problem for an insurer
who can sustain the loss  starting in health state Λ
1
 . Second, the constraint that the
contract prevents lapsation can be viewed as saying that the consumer’s continuation utility
starting in any period  when in health state Λ1 cannot be less than in an optimal contract
offered by an insurer who must break even, i.e., who has  = 0. We denote a contract
starting in period  for a consumer in health state Λ1 by Λ1 (·) and the optimal contract for




More formally, consider the problem that arises if a firm faces a consumer of type  in
health state Λ1 and can sustain, going forward, a (discounted expected) absolute loss of
. Let 
(Λ1 ) denote the set of period  contracts in health state Λ
1
 that break even in
expectation with a subsidy of  if no lapsation occurs, and let 

Λ1
(Λ1 (·)) be the consumer’s
discounted expected utility from contract Λ1 (·) starting in period  with health state Λ1 . In
addition, let Λ1 |Λ+10
(·) denote the continuation of contract Λ1 (·) starting in period 0   if
the health status realizations between period + 1 and 0 are Λ+10 ≡ (+1  0), resulting





® ≡ (1   +1  0). The optimal contract for a
consumer of type  is then described as follows:
Definition 1 ∗
Λ1
(·|) is an optimal contract for a consumer of type  signed in period  at
















11Note that because only the health state Λ1 matters for the distribution of future medical expenses, an
optimal contract will not depend on previous medical expense realizations.
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Note that problem (4) provides a recursive definition of the optimal contract. The con-
straint in this definition makes sure that at no continuation health history Λ+10 does the





with no subsidy. The constraint ensures us that, following the realization of con-




(·) that would at least break even and that also satisfies no-lapsation.
Our main characterization result, which we establish in Appendix A, is:
Proposition 1 The optimal contract for a consumer of type  starting in period  at health
state Λ1 , denoted by 
∗
Λ11
(·), is fully characterized by the zero-profit condition and, for all 0  
and Λ+10 such that (Λ
+1



















Under this contract, the consumer does not wish to secretly save.
In words, the optimal contract ∗
Λ1
(·) signed in period  at health state Λ1 offers in each






the maximum among the first-period consumption
levels offered by all the equilibrium contracts available along the way on continuation health
history Λ+10 . Thus, applying this result to the initial contracting in period 1, the optimal
contract starting in period 1 offers an initial consumption floor, which is then bumped up
to “match the market” in later periods   1 each time the consumer reaches a state in
which the market would offer a higher initial consumption floor. The equilibrium contract
provides full within-period insurance for the consumer (i.e., consumption in each period is
independent of ), and partial insurance against reclassification risk, as consumers who





1) for all  ≤ ] all enjoy the same level of consumption regardless of
differences in their period  health states. Since the consumer’s consumption level is always
weakly rising over time, the consumer never wishes to save.12
The guaranteed consumption levels in Proposition 1 are the counterpart for dynamic
health insurance contracts of the downwardly-rigid wages in Harris and Holmstrom (1983)’s
study of implicit labor contracts, where worker and firm are both learning about the worker’s
productivity parameter over time from observations of the worker’s Normally-distributed
output. Relative to their result, aside from the difference in setting, Proposition 1 allows for
12For a formal derivation, which requires specifying what happens if a consumer with hidden savings seeks
to buy insurance from a new firm, see Appendix B.
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a much more general stochastic process than the learning process in Harris and Holmstrom’s
analysis, which is necessary for the study of health insurance.
The optimal contract in Proposition 1 specifies the consumer’s consumption levels for
each possible health history and prevents lapsation. Note, however, that the same outcome
can alternatively be achieved by means of a much simpler guaranteed premium path contract
from which the consumer may lapse. Specifically, the consumer is given the option to renew,
if he has not yet lapsed, at the guaranteed premium path ∗(Λ11) ≡ (∗1   ∗ ) where
∗ =  − ∗Λ11(Λ
1
1) for  = 1  , provided that he has always renewed in the past.
13 That
is, the guaranteed premium path keeps consumption constant over time, equal to ∗
Λ11
(Λ11), as
long as the consumer sticks with the contract. But if the consumer arrives in a period  with
a sufficiently good health state Λ1 , he may choose not to renew, instead signing a contract





(Λ1 )  
∗
Λ11
(Λ11). Such lapses have no effect on the profit of the consumer’s initial insurer
as that firm was indifferent about whether to match the outside offer.14
2.3 Optimal Consumption Guarantees: Characterization and Com-
putation
Proposition 1 describes the structure of an optimal dynamic contract as involving evolving
consumption guarantees. The level of these guarantees is then determined by the condition
that the insurers offering them must break even. Determining the guarantees that break
even, however, is a recursive problem, because at each point in time and health state the
profit an insurer earns by offering a guarantee depends on the guarantees that competitive
insurers may be willing to offer the consumer in the future. In this section, we describe
this recursive condition and note a striking implication of it: the optimal contract does not
13This form of contract is the counterpart to the “Annual Renewable Term” life insurance contracts studied
in Hendel and Lizzeri (2003).
14The recursive formulation also makes clear that this equilibrium outcome can be achieved instead with
single-period contracts. A consumer in period 1 with health state Λ11 could purchase a contract that covers
all period 1medical expenses, and that in addition pays the consumer at the start of period 2 the amount that
the optimal contract implicitly subsidizes the realized continuation state Λ12. This amount would allow the
consumer to buy the long-term continuation contract on the open market. Upon reaching period 2, however,
the consumer could instead again buy a one-period policy of this type, and could continue in this manner
until period  . [This approach to replicating a long-term contract with a series of short-term contracts is
reminiscent of Fudenberg et al. (1990), although our setting is not captured in their model because of the
presence of lapsation constraints and the consumer’s inability to borrow.]
As noted in Cochrane (1995), such short-term contracts avoid the consumer being locked into an insurer,
perhaps resulting in better insurer performance as well as better matching of insurers and consumers when
health care networks are bundled with insurance provision. However, such contracts may require that courts
can verify the consumer’s health state Λ1 , while guaranteed premium path contracts do not.
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depend on the consumer’s risk preferences, (·), as long as the consumer is risk averse. This
condition also serves as the basis for computing optimal contracts in our empirical analysis.
For ease of notation, in this section we denote the initial consumption guarantee offered to
a consumer signing a contract in period  with health state Λ by 
∗
 (Λ). For concreteness,
and also anticipating our empirical analysis, we assume in our discussion a second-order
Markov process where Λ = (−1), although our observations here fully generalize.
Intuitively, for a consumer of type , we can first derive, for each possible last period state
Λ = (−1 ), the last period consumption levels ∗ (Λ ) =  − E[ | ] that would
be offered to a consumer in state Λ by competitive firms. We then look at each possible
state Λ−1 = (−2−1) in period  − 1 We find ∗−1(Λ−1) by doing a binary search
over possible values for the consumption guarantee −1, looking for the largest −1 that
generates non-negative profits for the insurer, taking account of the fact that the consumer
will yield the insurer continuation profits of zero in those states Λ in which 
∗
 (Λ )  −1
since the guarantee is either bumped up to match the market or the consumer lapses. We
then continue backward in this fashion, with the transitions (·) being used to generate
probabilities that the consumer is in each possible state at each future date (which also
generates the probability that the consumer will have lapsed by that date).
More formally, enumerate the 49 possible combinations of (−1) for each period  by
{∆ = (−1)}49=1. For each period , we denote by  the ( − +1)×49 matrix of first-
period consumption guarantees whose (  ) element for  ≥  and  ∈ {1  49} is ∗ (Λ),
a consumption guarantee that breaks even for a contract starting in period  with health
state Λ = Λ
, given the future guarantees described in Proposition 1 (which are, themselves,
contained in +1). We start at  =  where, as noted above, 
∗
 (Λ = Λ
) =  −E[ | ].





the transition probabilities. Specifically,  adds an additional row to 

+1; each element
( ) of this row is the consumption guarantee ∗ (Λ = Λ
). We derive this guarantee by
doing a binary search to find the (unique) value  that sets the insurer’s expected profit to
zero. A key observation that dramatically simplifies computation of the insurer’s expected
profit given a value of  is that, whenever the guarantee is bumped up, the insurer earns an
expected continuation profit of zero from that point on. This fact leads to the following
lemma characterizing the insurer’s expected discounted profit from a consumption guarantee:
Lemma 1 If consumption guarantee  is offered at health state Λ, then the expected dis-
counted profit to the insurer will be given by:
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where (|Λ = Λ +1 ) is the probability that, starting in health state Λ = Λ in
period  the health state transitions (Λ+1 Λ) from period  to period  are such that
Λ = Λ
 and ∗0 (Λ0) ≤  for all 0 ∈ {+ 1  }.15
Proof of Lemma 1. The first term in curly brackets in (6) is the expected profit in
period  given the initial consumption guarantee , while the second term in curly brackets
is the expected continuation profit from future periods at which the consumption level is
still equal to . Note that at any health state Λ such that 
∗
 (Λ)   (i.e., the lapsation
constraint binds), the insurer’s continuation payoff is zero. This is because at any health
state where the lapsation constraint binds, the insurer is offering the optimal contract for that
state, which we know is zero-profit. Therefore, Equation (6) fully captures the continuation
profit to the insurer by taking account of all future health states Λ0 at which 
∗
0 (Λ0) ≤ .
¥
Once we compute ∗ (Λ = Λ
) for all 49 values of Λ, we continue in this iterative manner
until we have derived 1 , whose first row gives the initial consumption guarantees offered in
period 1 to consumers in each of the 49 possible period-1 health states.
A striking, and perhaps surprising, feature of condition (6) is that it does not depend
on the degree of the consumer’s risk aversion embodied in (·) That is, the fact that the
consumer is risk averse matters — and is used to prove Proposition 1 — but the optimal
contract is the same for any two risk averse consumers who have the same stochastic health
process and income path.
Finally, note that, in general, an optimal dynamic contract could be an extremely compli-
cated object, specifying consumption levels along any possible health history (of which there
are Σ=17
 ones), potentially making the computation of an optimal contract an intractable
problem. However, our theoretical analysis has yielded two extremely useful properties for
computation: first, the characterization in Proposition 1 of optimal contracts in terms of
consumption guarantees and, second, the fact that the continuation profit of the consumer
is zero whenever the consumption guarantee is bumped up to match the market (or, equiv-
alently, if the consumer lapses).
15These probabilities are computed using +1 and the transitions (·).
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2.4 Comparison to Pauly, Kunreuther, and Hirth (1995) guaran-
teed renewable contracts
In an early analysis of the potential for dynamic health insurance contracts, Pauly, Kun-
reuther, and Hirth (1995) (PKH) proposed what they called “guaranteed renewable con-
tracts” as a solution to prevent reclassification risk.16 In contrast to the optimal long-term
contracts described in Proposition 1, PKH aimed to design a policy that provides full in-
surance in each period and guarantees that the consumer can renew in the future at the
same premium as would be offered to the healthiest consumer type at that age. The idea is
that a consumer with such a policy never wishes to lapse and faces no uncertainty in their
consumption (i.e, no reclassification risk).
To understand these contracts, consider the simplest case in which  = 2 for a consumer
who starts off in the healthiest possible state. (We consider the general case in Appendix C.)
In period 2 (the last period), the consumer pays a premium equal to 2 = E[2|Λ2 = (1 1)],
the expected medical expenses of the healthiest possible period-2 consumer. In period 1, the
consumer pays a premium of
1 = E[1|Λ1 = (1 1)] + {E[2|Λ1 = (1 1)]− E[2|Λ2 = (1 1)]}
= E[1|Λ1 = (1 1)] + Pr(Λ2 6= (1 1)|Λ1 = (1 1)){E[2|Λ2 6= (1 1)]− E[2|Λ2 = (1 1)]}
The first term is the consumer’s expected period-1 medical costs (since he starts with Λ1 =
(1 1)), while the second term is the prepayment of the expected period-2 discount being
offered to the consumer (which he enjoys when it turns out that Λ2 6= (1 1)). This prepayment
is necessarily (weakly) greater than the prepayment arising in the optimal contract, which
promises lower period-2 consumption than the PKH contract in all but the healthiest period-
2 state and therefore needs less front loading to enable the insurer to break even.
Unlike the optimal contracts described in Proposition 1, the PKH contracts do not opti-
mally balance the benefits of reducing reclassification risk against the costs of front-loading;
for example, as formula (28) makes clear, the PKH contract is unaffected by a consumer’s
income profile. The PKH contracts go to the extreme of completely preventing reclassifi-
cation risk, resulting in a fully deterministic consumption profile but excessively low initial
consumption.17
16Pauly, Kunreuther, and Hirth (1995) refer to their policies as guaranteed renewable contracts, but (as
they note) effectively treat them as guaranteed premium path contracts. Actual “guaranteed renewable”
contracts often instead merely state that the consumer has a right to renew at a rate at the insurer’s
discretion, but that must be the same as what the insurer offers to all other consumers in the same policy.
17Cochrane (1995) proposes a different insurance scheme to protect consumers from reclassification risk:
premium insurance. We discuss this scheme in Appendix C.
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2.5 Unobserved Types and Self-Selection
The analysis above assumed that a consumer’s lifetime income profile  = (1   ) was
known by both the consumer and all insurers. In reality, this is unlikely to be the case,
which could, in principle, pose an important obstacle to these contracts’ practical use. In this
subsection we show that insurers’ failure to possess this information poses no such problem.
Specifically, we show that if offered the collection of optimal contracts for all types derived
above, presented as guaranteed premium path contracts, consumers will self-select, choosing
the optimal contract for their type.18
Specifically, suppose that there is a set Θ of types in the market where, to recall, a
consumer’s type  = ( ) includes his income path and risk preferences.19 As above, a
guaranteed premium path contract is a  = (1   ) that allows the consumer to continue
coverage in period  paying premium  provided that he has not previously lapsed. As
described above, the optimal guaranteed premium path contract for a known type  starting
in period  when the consumer’s health state is Λ1 is denoted by the path 
∗(Λ1 ) ≡ { −
∗
Λ1
(Λ1 )}≥, a path that keeps consumption constant [equal to ∗Λ1 (Λ
1
 )] as income changes
from year to year.20
Our result is:
Proposition 2 Suppose that, in each period  = 1   , the menu of optimal guaranteed
premium path contracts {∗(Λ1 )}∈Θ is offered to a consumer in health state Λ1 , where
∗(Λ1 ) ≡ { − ∗Λ1 (Λ
1
 )}=. Then in each period the menu is self-selective and induces no
secret savings: that is, if a consumer of type  agrees to a new contract he chooses that type’s
optimal contract ∗(Λ1 ) and does not secretly save.
Proof. In Appendix B.
Since insurers cannot offer any type of consumer a greater value than in the optimal
contract and still break even, Proposition 2 implies that it is an equilibrium for this menu
of contracts to be offered, which results in the same allocation as if consumer types were
perfectly observable.
18Note that contracts that instead present the optimal contracts as guaranteed consumption levels (as in
Proposition 1), would clearly not induce self-selection as consumers with low lifetime incomes would choose
contracts intended for consumers with high lifetime incomes.
19Formally, we allow Θ to include all possible income paths  ∈ R+ to allow for the possibility of secret
savings (see footnote 56 in Appendix B). Also, while our discussion above showed that the optimal contract
does not depend on the consumer’s level of risk aversion embodied in (·), it is still possible that consumers’
misrepresentations could depend on (·). Thus, we suppose here that both  and  are private information
of the consumer.
20Our discussion above showed that the optimal contract does not depend on the consumer’s level of risk
aversion embodied in (·). However, it is still possible that consumers’ misrepresentations could depend on
(·), and so we suppose here that both  and  are private information of the consumer.
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2.6 Switching Costs
Recent evidence suggests that consumers may exhibit substantial inertia in their health
insurance choices [see, e.g., Handel (2013)]. We can extend our analysis to consider the
effect of switching costs, modeled as creating a consumption loss of   0 if the con-
sumer lapses and switches insurers. The key change this introduces is that the inequality
in the lapsation constraint in the period  problem (4) becomes  hΛ1 Λ+10 i(Λ1 |Λ+10 (·)) ≥
 hΛ1 Λ+10 i(
∗
hΛ1 Λ+10 i(·| − )); an insurer seeking to induce the consumer to lapse must now
incur the cost  to compensate the consumer for his switching cost. Nonetheless, as we show
in Appendix A, the basic structure of an optimal contract is unchanged when switching
costs are present, again involving consumption guarantees. Switching costs simply allow
those guarantees to be greater because healthy consumers are less likely to need to receive a
premium reduction (consumption increase) to prevent lapsation, enabling a greater shift of
resources from healthy to unhealthy states. They also allow for better consumption smooth-
ing over time, as less front-loading is needed to prevent lapsation.21
3 Data and Parameter Estimates
We investigate positive and normative outcomes for each type of contracting situation. To
predict equilibrium contracts and welfare under each regime we need four basic ingredients:
(i) expected medical costs conditional on an individual’s health status, (ii) the transitions
across health states as individuals age, (iii) preferences towards risk, and (iv) income profiles.
We focus on the sample of men that appear in the all-payer claims data from the State
of Utah for the years 2013-2015.22 This dataset includes detailed medical claims for each
individual in the state of Utah except for those individuals enrolled in traditional Medicare
or those who are uninsured. Our analysis studies all men in the data who (i) are 25-64
years old throughout the three-year sample period and (ii) appear in the data each month
throughout the sample period (e.g., they have no spells of non-insurance). We make the
latter restriction in order to ensure that we can cleanly capture health status transitions, as
described in more detail later. We focus on men here for simplicity, since men and women
have distinct stochastic health processes. We have also performed our analysis for women,
finding broadly similar results for contract structure and welfare.
21Indeed, these switching costs can be viewed as allowing for a limited amount of borrowing by the
consumer.
22These data are utilized as well in Lavetti et al. (2018), which contains a more complete description of
the data.
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Table 1: Sample statistics for (i) the entire sample of men aged 25-64 used in our equilibrium
analysis and (ii) 5-year age buckets within that sample. For each relevant group, “Popu-
lation” column reports the number of individuals, and “Mean” column reports the average
medical cost in 2015.
Table 1 describes our final sample of Utah men, with key descriptive statistics broken
down by age. Our sample has 212,265 men who averaged $4,650 in total medical spending
in 2015. Not surprisingly, average total medical spending is increasing with age.
3.1 Health States
The most essential part of the data is the available information on the diagnostics (ICD-9
codes) of each individual in the sample. We feed the diagnostic codes as well as other de-
mographics into the ACG software developed at Johns Hopkins Medical School to create
individual-level measures of predicted expected medical expenses for the upcoming year rel-
ative to the mean of the population.23 The output is an index that represents the health
status of each individual in the population. Since the ACG is used by insurers in their
underwriting processes, our empirics are based on similar information about risks that mar-
ket participants (insurers) have.24 We denote the ACG index by  and we refer to  as
individual ’s “health status” at time .
To ensure meaningful support when we estimate transition matrices, we partition the
health statuses into seven mutually exclusive and exhaustive bins that each contain one-
seventh of the final sample. Table 2 shows the proportion of individuals in each age group
23We use the Johns Hopkins ACG (Adjusted Clinical Groups) Case-Mix System. It is one of the most
widely used and respected risk adjustment and predictive modeling packages in the health care sector,
specifically designed to use diagnostic claims data to predict future medical expenditures.
24This is one of the main advantages of our empirical strategy. Most of the literature on health insurance
estimates the distribution of risks from observed insurance choices and realized total medical expenditures.
Instead our measure of risk is based on diagnosis codes and professional diagnostics (the ACG index).
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Health Status by Age
Age 1 (Healthy) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Sick)
25-29 0.55 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05
30-34 0.44 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05
35-39 0.37 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07
40-44 0.31 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.08
45-49 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.11
50-54 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15
55-59 0 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.20
60-64 0 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.25
Actuarial costs 837 1,376 1,973 3,052 4,356 6,840 20,507
Table 2: Health status by age in 2015 for our sample, where consumers are divided into 7
bins of their predicted medical spending (determined by their Johns Hopkins ACG predictive
score) for the year ahead. The “Actuarial costs" row reports how expected expenses in the
upcoming year vary across the consumer health status bins.
in each of these seven health categories, with bin 1 being the healthiest, and bin 7 being the
sickest. In its last row it also shows the expected expenses corresponding to each bin: an
individual in the healthiest bin has expected annual medical expenses of $837, while someone
in the sickest bin has expected annual medical expenses of $20,507.
3.2 Health State Transitions
The second key input into our empirical analysis is health transitions over time. We model
transitions in health status as a second-order Markov process in which the distribution of an
individual ’s period +1 status +1 is conditional on his health status in the previous two
years, Λ ≡ (−1 ).25 Specifically, once we have  for every individual and year in the
sample, we estimate year-to-year transition probabilities (+1|−1 ) for individuals
in five-year age groups (e.g., transitions within cohort 25-30) using the actual transitions
of consumers within each age range. (Again, the five-year grouping helps ensure adequate
populations in each cell.) The advantage of computing transitions of ACG scores as opposed
to medical expense transitions is that the ACG is based on persistent diagnostics. A broken
arm probably does not affect significantly future medical expense realizations while asthma
does. In other words, the ACG eliminates temporary expenses from the forecast of future
expenses.26 From the estimated probabilities (+1|−1 ) we construct the 49-by-49
health state transition matrices [giving the mapping from (−1  ) to ( +1 )] for
25We are limited by our data to modeling the dependency of transitions based only on the last two years.
Atal et al. (2019) also focus on a second-order Markov process for health state transitions.
26Admittedly, by defining transitions over ACGs we may miss potential information on what condition
led to the current ACG index that could entail different persistence beyond two years. However, we believe
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the five-year age bins from ages 25-65 as the foundation for modeling health state persistence
and transitions over time.
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimates of (+1|−1 ) for ages 30-35 and 40-45 re-
spectively (rounded to the nearest 0.01). Panel A shows transitions from states in which an
individual’s health statuses were the same in each of the two previous years (i.e., states in
which −1 = ). Entries along the diagonal of each matrix reflect health state persistence,
while off-diagonal elements reflect health state changes. For example, 73% of consumers aged
30-35 who are in the healthiest possible state (+1 =  = 1) are estimated to stay in the
healthiest health status for the following year. Only 6% of these consumers begin the fol-
lowing year in one of the four sickest bins (+1 ∈ {4 5 6 7}). On the other hand, 89% of
consumers who are in the worst possible health state (−1 =  = 7) begin the following
year in one of the two sickest bins (+1 ∈ {6 7}). The next two panels (B and C) show the
probabilities (+1|−1 ) when the consumer has had the worst possible health status
in at least one of the two previous years. Comparing the case where (−1 ) = (1 7)
to the case in which (−1 ) = (7 1), we see that the previous year’s health status has
greater importance than health status two years prior. Though the distributions of health
are different for 40-45 year olds, health states show similar persistence. 27
The persistence embodied in these health state transitions is illustrated in Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5 shows the net present value of expected medical expenses for different future periods
conditional on the consumer’s age 30 health state, focusing on health states in which the
consumer’s health status was the same at ages 29 and 30. Table 6 shows the same kind of
calculation for consumers starting at age 45. The tables show that while there is significant
persistence, much (but not all) of it dissipates after 10 years.28 29
3.3 Risk Preferences
The third ingredient is a consumer’s risk aversion, i.e., the degree to which consumption
smoothing over different states of the world is valued by consumers. In our main analysis,
we use the risk preferences estimated in Handel, Hendel, and Whinston (2015). There
that with the combination of using ACG scores rather than medical expenses, and two-year health states,
we capture the health transition process reasonably well.
27Lavetti et al. (2018) presents transition matrix estimates that are similar in spirit to those used here,
and has the matrices we use here available upon request.
28The fact that expected costs depend relatively little on the health state 10 years prior is consistent
with actuarial mortality tables. There are two kinds of tables: “ultimate” tables are based on attained age
only, while “select and ultimate” tables report the death rate not only by attained age, but by years since
underwriting (namely, conditional on being in good health at that time). The tables converge as the years
since underwriting increase; 10 years after underwriting the rates are quite similar.
29Note that complete persistence would eliminate the benefit of dynamic contracts as there would be no
reclassification risk to insure once a consumer’s age-25 health state is realized.
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+1
−1  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1 0.73 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
2 2 0.41 0.27 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02
3 3 0.20 0.21 0.28 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.02
4 4 0.08 0.09 0.19 0.32 0.15 0.11 0.05
5 5 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.37 0.21 0.06
6 6 0.04 0 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.51 0.23
7 7 0.02 0 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.77
Panel A: Health-state transition probabilities for −1 =  health states
+1
−1  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1 0.73 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
1 2 0.52 0.23 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
1 3 0.42 0.21 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.02
1 4 0.34 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.03
1 5 0.27 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.06
1 6 0.39 0.18 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.05
1 7 0.30 0.18 0.19 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.12
Panel B: Health-state transition probabilities for −1 = 1 health states
+1
−1  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7 1 0.63 0.25 0.12 0 0 0 0
7 2 0.52 0.26 0.22 0 0 0 0
7 3 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.14 0.13 0.10 0
7 4 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.14 0.13 0
7 5 0 0 0.11 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.12
7 6 0 0 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.37 0.34
7 7 0.02 0 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.77
Panel C: Health-state transition probabilities for −1 = 7 health states
Table 3: Health status transitions from one year to the next, for 30-35 year old men.
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+1
−1  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1 0.66 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01
2 2 0.29 0.29 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.03
3 3 0.12 0.16 0.32 0.20 0.10 0.05 0.03
4 4 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.35 0.20 0.11 0.07
5 5 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.17 0.35 0.23 0.10
6 6 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.49 0.23
7 7 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.74
Panel A: Health-state transition probabilities for −1 =  health states
+1
−1  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1 0.66 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01
1 2 0.40 0.25 0.18 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02
1 3 0.30 0.23 0.23 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.03
1 4 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.09 0.07 0.05
1 5 0.23 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.04
1 6 0.28 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.06
1 7 0.28 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.13
Panel B: Health-state transition probabilities for −1 = 1 health states
+1
−1  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7 1 0.59 0.18 0.23 0 0 0 0
7 2 0.30 0.34 0.36 0 0 0 0
7 3 0.12 0.13 0.31 0.26 0.11 0 0.07
7 4 0 0.10 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.13 0.12
7 5 0 0 0.11 0.23 0.27 0.25 0.14
7 6 0 0 0 0.07 0.18 0.41 0.33
7 7 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.74
Panel C: Health-state transition probabilities for −1 = 7 health states
Table 4: Health status transitions from one year to the next, for 40-45 year old men.
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Health status Ages
(age 29 and 30) 30 31-35 36-40 41-64
1 0.84 1.83 2.39 4.2
2 1.37 2.22 2.58 4.24
3 1.97 2.83 2.87 4.28
4 3.05 3.98 3.41 4.37
5 4.36 4.77 3.81 4.43
6 6.84 8.35 5.26 4.65
7 20.51 13.05 6.31 4.78
Table 5: This table reports, for various age ranges, the constant annual medical expenses
(in thousands of dollars) such that the present discounted value of these constant annual
expenses equals the expected present discounted value of expenses over the age range in
question for a Utah man in various age-30 health states.
Health status Ages
(age 44 and 45) 45 46-50 51-55 56-64
1 0.84 2.27 4.07 5.35
2 1.37 3.17 4.54 5.51
3 1.97 3.62 4.77 5.58
4 3.05 4.51 5.19 5.70
5 4.36 5.74 5.73 5.85
6 6.84 8.22 6.59 6.07
7 20.51 13.05 7.90 6.38
Table 6: This table reports, for various age ranges, the constant annual medical expenses
(in thousands of dollars) such that the present discounted value of these constant annual
expenses equals the expected present discounted value of expenses over the age range in
question for a Utah man in various age-45 health states.
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we estimate a panel discrete choice model where risk aversion is identified by the choices
that households make conditional on their household-specific health expenditure risk for the




where  =  −  −  is consumption (which equals income  less premium payments  and
out-of-pocket medical expenses ) and  is the risk aversion parameter. The mean estimated
risk-aversion level is 00004, which falls within the range reported in the literature. We
also consider the robustness of our conclusions with respect to the degree of risk aversion in
Section 7.3.
3.4 Income profiles
The shape of the optimal contract depends on a consumer’s income profile. Insurers offer
different contracts to consumers with different income profiles to maximize their lifetime
expected utilities conditional on breaking even and the lapsation constraint. We study this
effect by computing optimal contracts and welfare for several different income profiles that
vary in how steeply income rises with age. The least steep is a flat net income profile, in
which the change in income each year equals the change in the population’s average medical
expenses. With this income profile, there are no intertemporal consumption smoothing
motives (for an individual who would pay a premium in each period equal to the population
average medical costs), as individuals with flat net income do not want to use the contract
as a mechanism to borrow or save, unlike consumers with increasing or decreasing income
profiles over time.30 We also examine several more steeply rising income profiles, based on the
income profiles we observed in Handel, Hendel, and Whinston (2015) for managers and non-
managers in the firm studied there. Income profiles of managers at the firm were steepest,
while those of non-managers were flatter but still steeper than a flat net income profile.
Figure 1 shows the manager income profile as the highest dashed curve, while non-managers’
income profile is represented by the flatter curve comprised of long and short dashes. The
bold dashed curve in the figure is a proportionally scaled-down managers’ income profile that
makes the present value of lifetime income equal to that of a non-manager (which facilitates
certain comparative statics we present). The solid curve is a flat net income profile with the
same net present value as the non-manager and downscaled-manager profiles.
30The population average medical costs over time are close to the expected medical costs over time of a
consumer conditional on being in the healthiest state at age 25. Thus, such a consumer has little incentive
to borrow or save if they have a flat net income profile.
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Figure 1:
4 Results: Optimal Contracts
Using the data and computational approach described above, in the remainder of the paper
we find the consumptions and premiums for empirically-based optimal dynamic contracts
with one-sided commitment, and then compare their outcome to those in various benchmarks.
Although our analysis is necessarily stylized given the institutional intricacies of insurance
provision in the U.S. (e.g., we conduct our analysis for several typical income paths, don’t
consider movement between an employer insurance sector and the long-term contract, and
don’t consider possibilities for medical expense reductions through uncompensated charitable
care or bankruptcy), relative to prior work it provides empirical insights into the structure
and potential benefits of long-term health insurance contracts.
In this section, we first study the structure of these contracts, examining the extent to
which they are front-loaded, the degree of reclassification risk they insure, and how these
contract characteristics depend on a consumer’s income profile. We then turn in Sections 5
and 6 to welfare analysis: In Section 5 we analyze the extent to which these optimal dynamic
contracts eliminate the welfare losses from reclassification risk, and how this depends on
consumers’ income profiles, and in Section 6 we compare the welfare achieved by these
contracts to that in a managed competition-style exchange.
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First-Year Equilibrium Contract Terms: Flat Net Income
24 = 25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Premium 2.294 3.472 4.156 6.255 11.444 13.733 20.511
First-Year Costs 0.837 1.375 1.973 3.054 4.358 6.842 20.511
Front-Loading 1.457 2.098 2.182 3.201 7.086 6.891 0
Consumption 54.765 53.586 52.903 50.803 45.615 43.326 36.548
Table 7: First-year contract terms in the equilibrium long-run contract for men with a flat
net income path, showing first-year premiums, expected costs, the extent of front-loading,
and consumption levels (thousands of dollars).
4.1 Front-loading and Reclassification Risk
We begin by considering the optimal contract for a consumer with flat net income (cor-
responding to the solid curve in Figure 1, an income profile that creates no borrowing or
savings motive when a consumer faces the at-birth ex ante expected medical expenses at
each age).
In our context, a contract specifies a premium, or equivalently, a consumption level for
each possible history of states at each age from 25 to 65. There are too many histories and
concurrent premiums/consumption levels to present: instead we focus on select attributes of
the contract. First, we look in detail at the early contract periods, which provide intuition for
the form of the equilibrium contract over longer time horizons. The first-period premiums,
consumption levels, actuarial costs, and front-loading are presented in Table 7 for consumers
whose health status at ages 24 and 25 were the same (i.e., with 24 = 25). In all but the
worst state (Λ25 = (7 7)), premiums are larger than actuarial costs: consumers front-load
premiums to transfer utility to future states with negative health shocks. For example, for
the healthiest consumer at the beginning of the year (Λ25 = (1 1)), the premium is $2,294
despite average costs of only $837.
The extent of front-loading rises as the consumer’s health state worsens to bin 5 out of
7, and then declines to zero for the sickest bin of consumers (7 out of 7). The extent of
front-loading depends on both the current state and also on the implications of the current
state for future health. While the healthiest type can afford the most front-loading, he
might benefit the least. This is why maximum front-loading occurs for consumers in the
middle of the ex ante health range, rather than for the healthiest consumers. The least
healthy, on the other hand, have very high current costs (and, hence, high marginal utility
of consumption) compared to their expected future costs (recall Table 5); for them, front-
loading isn’t worthwhile.
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Second-Year Equilibrium Premiums: Flat Net Income First-Year
26 Premium
24 = 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2.403 2.429 2.429 2.429 2.429 2.429 2.429 2.294
2 2.864 3.445 3.607 3.607 3.607 3.607 3.607 3.472
3 2.941 3.716 4.088 4.291 4.291 4.291 4.291 4.156
4 2.470 3.063 4.454 6.004 6.390 6.390 6.390 6.255
5 2.397 2.891 3.850 6.224 11.240 11.578 11.578 11.444
6 2.349 2.667 3.184 5.669 11.385 13.599 13.867 13.733
7 2.385 2.470 2.650 4.975 15.809 14.798 20.511 20.511
Table 8: First- and second-year premiums in the equilibrium long-run contract for men with
a flat net income path, as a function of the period 1 health state and period 2 health status
(thousands of dollars).
Tables 8 and 9 present second-period premiums and consumptions, respectively, for the
seven possible age-26 health statuses that can follow the seven age-25 health states considered
in Table 7. (These age-26 health status realizations 26 give rise to the age-26 health state
Λ26 = (25 26).) Certain patterns are indicative of the longer-run structure of the contract.
First, second-period premiums and consumptions display extensive pooling which takes place
in states for which the lapsation constraint is not binding. For example, if a consumer was
in the healthiest possible state at age 25, Λ25 = (1 1), all second-year states Λ26 = (1 26)
with 26  1 have the same consumption of $54,765, an amount equal to his first-year
consumption. The lapsation constraint does not bind for this consumer when 26  1 because
the first period front-loaded amount suffices to make outside offers less attractive than the
current consumption guarantee. Only when 26 = 1 does the lapsation constraint bind
for this consumer, resulting in an increase in consumption to $54,791 (and a corresponding
reduction in the premium).
The lapsation constraint binds for more and more second-year states the sicker the con-
sumer was at the start of the contract. For consumers initially in the sickest health state,
Λ25 = (7 7), all age-26 health states involve different consumption levels that also differ from
the first-period consumption level: long-run contracts cannot provide any insurance against
reclassification risk in year 2 for this consumer as his first-year needs were so great as to
preclude any front loading. For this consumer, the long-run contract continuation at age 26
simply matches the best contract he could get on the market given his age-26 health state.
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Second-Year Equilibrium Consumptions: Flat Net Income First-Year
26 Consumption
24 = 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 54.791 54.765 54.765 54.765 54.765 54.765 54.765 54.765
2 54.330 53.749 53.586 53.586 53.586 53.586 53.586 53.586
3 54.253 53.478 53.106 52.903 52.903 52.903 52.903 52.903
4 54.724 54.13 52.739 51.189 50.803 50.803 50.803 50.803
5 54.796 54.303 53.343 50.970 45.954 45.615 45.615 45.615
6 54.845 54.527 54.010 51.524 45.809 43.595 43.326 43.326
7 54.809 54.724 54.544 52.219 41.384 42.396 36.683 36.548
Table 9: First- and second-year consumptions in the equilibrium long-run contract for men
with a flat net income path, as a function of the period 1 health state and period 2 health
status (thousands of dollars).
4.2 Effects of Income profiles
The equilibrium contracts offered depend crucially on a consumer’s rate of income growth
over his lifetime. When income is relatively low early in life, and hence the marginal utility
of consumption is relatively high, front-loading is quite costly for utility.
Table 10 presents first-period (age-25) contract characteristics for “downscaled man-
agers,” and is the analog to Table 7 for flat net income. Recall that, as shown in Figure 1,
a downscaled manager income profile proportionally scales down the income of a manager
to match the net present value of a non-manager’s lifetime income profile. The table makes
clear that for downscaled managers, the extent of front-loading is much more limited than
in the flat net income case, which translates into less generous consumption guarantees later
in life. For example, a downscaled manager who is in the healthiest state (Λ25 = (1 1))
at age 25 front-loads only $328, compared to $1,457 for a consumer with flat net income.
Essentially, the rapidly rising income makes paying extra early in life for long-term insurance
quite costly, as marginal utility is high early compared to what is expected later in life.
Tables 11 and 12 show second-year (age-26) premiums and consumption levels for down-
scaled managers as a function of different health histories. Though front-loading is much
more limited, the age-26 health states in which the lapsation constraint binds, conditional on
the initial age-25 health state, are quite similar to those of consumers with flat net income
profiles.
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First-Year Equilibrium Contract Term: Downscaled Managers
24 = 25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Premium 1.165 2.196 2.740 3.487 8.089 10.887 20.511
First-Year Costs 0.837 1.375 1.973 3.054 4.358 6.842 20.511
Front-Loading 0.328 0.821 0.767 0.433 3.732 4.046 0
Consumption 32.520 31.490 30.945 30.199 25.596 22.799 13.175
Table 10: First-year contract terms in the equilibrium long-run contract for men with a
downscaled manager income path, showing first-year premiums, expected costs, the extent
of front-loading, and consumption levels (thousands of dollars).
Second-Year Equilibrium Premiums: Downscaled Managers First-Year
26 Premium
24 = 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1.160 1.873 2.605 3.012 3.012 3.012 3.012 1.165
2 1.542 2.190 2.356 3.414 4.042 4.042 4.042 2.196
3 1.636 2.077 2.755 4.587 4.587 4.587 4.587 2.740
4 0.884 1.405 2.548 3.490 5.334 5.334 5.334 3.487
5 0.841 1.375 2.249 3.608 8.066 9.936 9.936 8.089
6 0.837 1.375 1.973 3.320 8.219 10.882 12.734 10.887
7 0.843 1.375 1.973 3.054 11.895 11.851 20.511 20.511
Table 11: First- and second-year premiums in the equilibrium long-run contract for men with
a downscaled manager income path, as a function of the period 1 health state and period 2
health status (thousands of dollars).
Second-Year Equilibrium Consumption: Downscaled Managers First-Year
26 Consumption
24 = 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 34.372 33.659 32.927 32.520 32.520 32.520 32.520 32.520
2 33.990 33.342 33.176 32.118 31.490 31.490 31.490 31.490
3 33.896 33.455 32.777 30.945 30.945 30.945 30.945 30.945
4 34.648 34.127 32.984 32.042 30.199 30.199 30.199 30.199
5 34.691 34.158 33.283 31.925 27.466 25.596 25.596 25.596
6 34.695 34.158 33.559 32.212 27.314 24.651 22.799 22.799
7 34.689 34.158 33.559 32.478 23.637 23.681 15.021 13.175
Table 12: First- and second-year consumptions in the equilibrium long-run contract for men
with a downscaled manager income path, as a function of the period 1 health state and
period 2 health status (thousands of dollars).
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5 Results: Welfare
We now turn to the welfare analysis of these dynamic contracts. We measure and compare
the welfare they achieve to several alternatives. For each market setup and potential income
profile considered, we compute a lifetime certainty equivalent. The certainly equivalent
represents the constant consumption for the forty years of life from age 25 to 65 that makes
the consumer as well off as in a given market setup. Specifically, we compare the certainty
equivalent of optimal dynamic contracts with one-sided commitment, denoted by , to
the three benchmarks we have described previously (see Section 2.1 for formal definitions):31
(i) The first-best, fully-smoothed consumption ∗, which equates the marginal utility of
consumption across periods and states. This is the welfare achievable were long-term
contracts with two-sided commitment feasible;
(ii) The certainty equivalent from spot contracts that fully insure event risk in every period
and state, but leave reclassification risk across periods fully uninsured, denoted by
 ;
(iii) The constant consumption equivalent of the No Borrowing/No Saving constrained first
best, in which risk is fully insured in each period but neither borrowing nor saving is
possible, denoted ∗.
5.1 Welfare Effects Conditional on a Consumer’s Age-25 Health
State
Table 13 shows welfare outcomes for Utah men with a flat net income profile who arrive at
age 25 in each of the seven health states Λ25 in which their age-24 and age-25 health status is
the same (i.e., in which 24 = 25; these are the health states examined in Tables 3-12). For
each age-25 health state, column (1) reports the annual consumption level ∗ in a first-best
contract that starts at age 25 given the income profile and expected future medical expenses
the consumer faces given his age-25 health state.32 It ranges from $54,960 for the healthiest
consumer state Λ25 = (1 1) to $49,330 for a consumer in the worst state Λ25 = (7 7).
Column (2) shows ∗, the constant consumption equivalent of the constrained first-best
outcome that does not allow for intertemporal consumption smoothing.
31In Section 6 we compare dynamic contracts as well to an ACA-style insurance exchange.
32In this and the other three tables in this subsection, “ex ante” certainty equivalents are calculated from
the perspective of a consumer who arrives at age 25 in a particular health state. Thus, for example, the
first-best consumption of a consumer with flat net income will differ across consumers with different health
states Λ25 because of their differing expected medical costs.
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Initial health (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
24 25 










1 1 55.14 55.10 45.31 55.03 0.178 0.994 0.989
2 2 54.96 54.94 45.03 54.80 0.180 0.986 0.984
3 3 54.84 54.83 44.92 54.62 0.181 0.979 0.978
4 4 54.36 54.34 44.45 53.69 0.182 0.934 0.933
5 5 52.86 52.14 42.47 49.62 0.185 0.739 0.688
6 6 51.51 49.42 41.53 47.08 0.160 0.703 0.556
7 7 49.33 42.61 39.94 40.72 0.063 0.291 0.083
Table 13: Long-run welfare results showing the certainty equivalent annual consumption of
different insurance institutions under various initial health states, the flat net income profile,
a discount factor of 0975, and constant absolute risk aversion equal to 00004. Units in
columns (1)-(4) are 1000s of dollars.
For consumers with rising net income, ∗ may be a more relevant benchmark of
the losses from spot contracting and of how well optimal dynamic contracts with one-sided
commitment do at eliminating reclassification risk, since saving and borrowing on their own
can greatly improve utility for steep net income profiles. (For a healthy consumer with flat
net income, however, this certainty equivalent is very close to ∗.) Column (3) shows welfare
under spot contracts for each of these consumers, while Column (5) shows the welfare loss




, a measure that captures
solely the loss under spot contracting arising from reclassification risk. This welfare loss is
very large: many of these consumers lose roughly 18% of their lifetime (age 25-65) certainty
equivalent because of reclassification risk.
Column (4) presents the certainty equivalent for dynamic contracts with one-sided com-
mitment, . As expected  lies between 
∗
 and  . Column (5) shows
the fraction of the welfare gap between the No-borrowing/No-saving constrained first-best
and spot contracts that these dynamic contracts close, −
∗

− . Overall, dynamic
contracts are extremely effective at reducing reclassification risk for consumers who arrive
at age 25 in excellent health: for a consumer in age-25 health state Λ25 = (1 1), dynamic
contracts close 99.4% of the gap between ∗ and  . But they are very ineffective
for consumers who arrive at age 25 in poor health. At the extreme, a consumer who arrives
at age 25 in the worst health state, Λ25 = (1 1), dynamic contracts recover only 29.1% of the
welfare loss due to reclassification risk under spot contracting. The reason for this pattern
is that consumers who arrive at age 25 in poor health have a high level of current medical
expenses, which makes front-loading very costly and therefore greatly limits the effective-
ness of dynamic contracts. For completeness, column (7) reports −
∗− , which shows
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Initial health (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
24 25 










1 1 55.14 48.68 41.39 48.26 0.150 0.943 0.500
2 2 54.96 48.11 39.78 47.41 0.173 0.915 0.502
3 3 54.84 47.64 39.31 46.84 0.175 0.903 0.485
4 4 54.36 46.77 40.23 45.42 0.140 0.794 0.367
5 5 52.86 43.63 34.91 40.41 0.200 0.631 0.307
6 6 51.51 40.21 33.42 37.69 0.169 0.629 0.236
7 7 49.33 30.71 29.78 29.88 0.030 0.105 0.005
Table 14: Long-run welfare results showing the certainty equivalent annual consumption of
different insurance institutions under various initial health states, the non-manager income
profile, a discount factor of 0975, and constant absolute risk aversion equal to 00004. Units
in columns (1)-(4) are 1000s of dollars.
Initial health (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
24 25 










1 1 85.47 57.12 51.81 56.87 0.093 0.954 0.150
2 2 85.28 56.51 49.60 55.97 0.122 0.922 0.179
3 3 85.17 55.95 48.96 55.36 0.125 0.917 0.177
4 4 84.68 55.04 52.53 54.54 0.046 0.801 0.063
5 5 83.18 52.68 44.97 50.05 0.146 0.658 0.133
6 6 81.83 49.40 43.21 47.10 0.125 0.629 0.101
7 7 79.66 38.16 37.75 37.77 0.011 0.051 0.001
Table 15: Long-run welfare results showing the certainty equivalent annual consumption
of different insurance institutions under various initial health states, the manager income
profile, a discount factor of 0975, and constant absolute risk aversion equal to 00004. Units
in columns (1)-(4) are 1000s of dollars.
the proportion of the gap between spot contracting and the first-best closed by dynamic
contracts.
Tables 14—16 report the same welfare statistics but for consumers with non-manager,
manager, and downscaled manager income profiles. Welfare losses from reclassification risk
(shown, again, in column (5)) are similarly large for consumers with rising income profiles.
Comparing column (6) for the cases with rising income profiles to the flat net income profile
case shows that rising income profiles reduce the effectiveness of dynamic contracts by making
front-loading more costly, since with a rising income profile the marginal utility of a current
dollar is larger than the marginal utility of future dollars. The effect is particularly dramatic
for consumers in poor health states: for example, for a consumer in state Λ25 = (7 7),
dynamic contracts reduce the loss from reclassification risk by 29.1% if the consumer has a
flat net income profile, but by only 7.6% if he has a downscaled manager income profile.
33
Initial health (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
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1 1 55.14 39.07 32.73 38.76 0.162 0.951 0.269
2 2 54.96 38.47 30.75 37.87 0.201 0.922 0.294
3 3 54.84 37.94 30.19 37.26 0.204 0.912 0.287
4 4 54.36 37.07 32.40 36.13 0.126 0.799 0.170
5 5 52.86 34.23 25.87 31.31 0.244 0.651 0.202
6 6 51.51 30.82 24.26 28.47 0.213 0.642 0.155
7 7 49.33 20.56 19.89 19.94 0.032 0.076 0.002
Table 16: Long-run welfare results showing the certainty equivalent annual consumption of
different insurance institutions under various initial health states, the downscaled manager
income profile, a discount factor of 0975, and constant absolute risk aversion equal to 00004.
Units in columns (1)-(4) are 1000s of dollars.
5.2 Welfare Effects from the Perspective of an Unborn Consumer
We now turn to evaluating the welfare effects of dynamic contracts from the perspective of
an unborn consumer who does not know what his age-25 health state will be. We compute
these welfare measures using the distribution of age-25 health states that we see empirically
among our age-25 Utah men. Table 17 shows the results.
Recall that, to ease comparisons across different income profiles, all profiles we consider
have the same net present value of income, except for the manager’s profile when it is not
downscaled. Column (1) of Table 17 shows the first-best consumption (reflecting the present
value of income minus expected medical expenses, now calculated from the perspective of a
consumer who does not yet know their age-25 health state), which are $54,670 for the flat-
net, non-manager, and downscaled manager income profiles, and $85,000 for the manager
income profile. Column (2) gives the certainty equivalent of the No-Borrowing/No-Saving full
insurance regime, again based on expected medical expenses calculated from the perspective
of a consumer who does not yet know their age-25 health state.
Column (3) shows welfare outcomes under spot contracts, with no protection for reclassi-
fication risk, while column (4) shows the certainty equivalent of the optimal dynamic contract
regime, both from the perspective of an unborn consumer.33 The welfare loss from reclas-
sification risk, shown in column (5), ranges between 18.4% and 27.4% of lifetime certainty
33∗ in Table 17 equals the expectation of the 
∗
 values for consumers in the various age-25
health states, evaluated using the empirical distribution of age-25 health states. In contrast, because of risk
aversion,  in Table 17 is less than the expectation of the  values for consumers in the various age-25
health states.
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Flat net 54.67 54.67 44.35 48.83 0.189 0.434 0.434
Non-mngr 54.67 47.37 36.96 38.08 0.220 0.108 0.063
Manager 85.00 55.67 45.44 45.91 0.184 0.046 0.012
Downs Mngr 54.67 37.68 27.35 28.13 0.274 0.075 0.028
Table 17: Unborn consumer welfare results showing the certainty equivalent annual con-
sumption of different insurance institutions under various income profiles, a discount factor
of 0975, and constant absolute risk aversion equal to 00004. Units in columns (1)-(4) are
1000s of dollars.
equivalent (relative to the no-borrowing/no-savings benchmark).34 For a flat net income
profile, column (6) shows that 43.4% of this gap is recovered by dynamic contracts. In con-
trast, since consumers with steeper income profiles dislike front-loading, dynamic contracts
recover a very small portion of this welfare loss for these consumers (7.5% for downscaled
managers).
In summary, from the perspective of an unborn Utah male with a flat net income profile,
optimal dynamic contracts would be moderately effective at reducing the reclassification risk
they face. However, from the perspective of an unborn Utah male with a rising net income
profile, these contracts would not be very effective. The moderate effectiveness with a flat net
income reflects the fact that dynamic contracts poor performance for consumers who arrive
at age 25 in poor health, and thus with high immediate consumption needs, has a substantial
effect on the value of dynamic contracts from the ex ante perspective of an unborn consumer.
Once coupled with more steeply rising income paths, which further accentuate the value of
net income when young, dynamic contracts prove rather ineffective from an ex ante welfare
perspective.
5.3 Insurance of Pre-age-25 Health Risk
The results in Tables 13-16 indicate that in a regime in which consumers sign long-term
dynamic contracts upon reaching age 25, their post-age-25 welfare is greatly affected by the
realization of their age-25 health state. In Table 18 we examine how welfare would be affected
if the government insured consumers’ pre-age-25 health realizations. We consider this in
two ways. First, we ask what the expected per capita cost would be for the government to
ensure that each consumer’s continuation certainty equivalent starting at age 25 is the same
34In Section 7.2 we extend this analysis to allow precautionary savings in the spot contracting regime
and find similar results. This is not surprising as the main loss with a rising income path from a lack of
interporal smoothing comes from the inability to borrow.
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Flat net 54.67 54.67 44.35 48.83 12.05 53.91 0.926
Non-mngr 54.67 47.37 36.96 38.08 8.81 45.24 0.795
Manager 85.00 55.67 45.44 45.91 5.47 54.05 0.842
Downs Mngr 54.67 37.68 27.35 28.13 7.07 35.79 0.817
Table 18: Unborn consumer welfare results showing the certainty equivalent annual con-
sumption of different insurance institutions under various income profiles, a discount factor
of 0975, and constant absolute risk aversion equal to 00004. Column (5) shows the expected
one-time subsidy required at age 25 for the consumer to have in all age-25 states the same
level of welfare as if he had been in the healthiest possible age-25 health state. Column
(6) shows the certainty equivalent welfare level resulting from a balanced budget scheme
that optimally insures the consumer’s pre-age-25 health risk prior to the start of dynamic
contracting at age 25. Units in columns (1)-(6) are 1000s of dollars.
as if he had reached age 25 in the healthiest state, Λ25 = (1 1). Second, we derive the set of
break-even subsidies that most efficiently insure the age-25 health risk these consumers face.
This involves finding the subsidy or tax for consumers in each of the 49 health age-25 states
such that (i) the government breaks even in expectation, and (ii) the welfare of an unborn
consumer is maximized.35
Column (5) reports the (one-time) expected per capita cost of subsidies that insure that,
under a regime of optimal dynamic contracts that begin at age 25, every consumer has
the same certainty equivalent as if he had arrived at age 25 in health state Λ25 = (1 1).
This cost ranges from $5,470 for a manger income profile to $12,050 for a flat net income
profile. Column (6) reports the certainty equivalent achieved instead when optimal dynamic
contracts starting at age 25 are coupled with a break-even government insurance scheme that
insures against consumers’ pre-age-25 health risks, which we label as +, while column
(7) shows what fraction of the reclassification risk losses are recovered through a combination
of this kind of government policy and optimal dynamic contracts starting at age 25. When
combined with this pre-age-25 insurance, dynamic contracts eliminate roughly 80-90% of
reclassification risk. One can think of these policies to insure age-25 risk as similar in
spirit to the risk-adjustment, risk-corridor, and reinsurance regulations present in the ACA
(and many other current environments) but applied to age-25 consumers choosing dynamic
contracts instead of consumers of all ages choosing year-to-year contracts. The results show
that long-term dynamic contracts can be rather effective at eliminating reclassification risk
35Note that this does not generally yield equal certainty equivalents for the 49 health states because the
marginal utility of a dollar subsidy is state-dependent.
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in combination with government insurance of consumers’ health risks that occur before they
reach the insurance market at age 25.
6 Comparison to a managed-competition insurance ex-
change
One of the most significant features of the health insurance exchanges created by the ACA
was their ban on the pricing of pre-existing conditions. In this section, we examine
how dynamic contracts do at eliminating reclassification risk compared to an managed
competition-style insurance exchange. As discussed in Handel, Hendel, andWhinston (2015),
while the ACA fully eliminated reclassification risk, it created adverse selection, as consumers
with differing health could not be differentially priced. This adverse selection led to signifi-
cant unraveling in the exchange model studied in Handel, Hendel, and Whinston (2015), so
that in most cases all consumers ended up obtaining insurance contracts covering only 60%
of their expenses.
In this section we compare the welfare achievable with optimal dynamic contracts, both
with and without government insurance of pre-age-25 health risk, to the level of welfare
that would arise in an managed competition-style insurance exchange.36 Because consumers
end up only partly insured in such an exchange, computing welfare requires as an input the
full distribution of health expenses conditional on an individual’s health state, rather than
just its mean. We have previously estimated this full distribution for the consumers in the
Handel, Hendel, and Whinston (2015) sample and we make use of this information here.
Specifically, we examine how dynamic contracts would perform for the Handel, Hendel, and
Whinston (2015) consumers if they had the transitions that we have estimated for Utah men,
and compare it to what the ACA would achieve.37
Specifically, we compute welfare under a managed competition-style insurance exchange
by imposing (i) one-year contracts, (ii) community rating (no health-state based pricing
allowed), (iii) age-based pricing, (iv) a fully enforced mandate, requiring insurance purchase,
36The ACA insured pre-age-25 risk through its ban on pre-existing conditions, so a natural comparison is
to dynamic contracts combined with insurance of pre-age-25 risk.
37The sample in Handel, Hendel, and Whinston (2015) is too small to estimate second-order Markov
transitions, while for the Utah sample we have only mean health costs conditional on health states, not
the full distributions. For these reasons we combine the data in the two samples for this analysis. We
have examined the effect of dynamic contracts in both the Utah and Handel, Hendel, and Whinston (2015)
samples with first-order Markov processes and found similar results. By way of comparison to the male Utah
sample, in the Handel, Hendel, and Whinston (2015) sample, the expected costs conditional on each of the
seven health statuses (going from healthiest to sickest) are $1,131, $2,290, $3,780, $3,975, $5,850, $10,655,
and $18,554. Comparing to Table 2, Utah expenses were lower in bins 1-6, but higher for consumers with
the worst health status.
37
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)









Flat net 54.62 54.62 52.70 54.12 52.90 0.890 0.622
Non-mngr 54.62 47.25 43.19 45.90 46.44 0.710 0.826
Manager 84.95 55.52 51.25 54.52 54.77 0.777 0.833
Downs Mngr 54.62 37.55 33.37 36.36 36.78 0.740 0.832
Table 19: Long-run welfare results showing the certainty equivalent annual consumption of
different insurance institutions, including a managed competition-style insurance exchange
(labeled “ACA”), for the large employer sample of Handel, Hendel, and Whinston (2015).
Assumes a discount factor of 0975 for consumers with median estimated constant absolute
risk aversion equal to 00004. Units in columns (1)-(5) are 1000s of dollars.
and (v) insurers that offer plans covering specific actuarial values, with a minimum plan
covering 60% of an average individual’s spending that the market unravels to. For simplicity,
we will refer to this outcome in the rest of this section as the “ACA outcome” and denote
its certainty equivalent by .
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 19 give the (unborn) certainty equivalents for institutions that
were in Table 1738, while column (5) gives the corresponding certainty equivalent under the
ACA. Comparing columns (3) and (5), dynamic contracts without government insurance of
pre-age-25 health risk are worse than the ACA outcome for all income profiles. One possible
reason for this difference is that community rating implicitly insures consumers’ pre-age-25
health risk.
Column (4), on the other hand, shows the welfare level achievable for this sample when
dynamic contracts are coupled with insurance of pre-age-25 health risk. Columns (6) and
(7) show how much of the gap between spot contracting and the No-Borrowing/No-Savings
benchmark is closed by dynamic contracts with insurance of pre-age-25 health risk and the
ACA outcome, respectively.39 Comparing columns (6) and (7) in Table 19 reveals that
the managed competition-style insurance exchange environment is preferred to the dynamic
contracting environment even with insurance of pre-age-25 health risk for non-managers,
managers, and downscaled managers, whose incomes rise over time. For these individuals,
the desire to front-load when young and income is relatively low is limited, which reduces the
38Note that the welfare levels for ∗ and ∗ here differ from those in Table 17 because mean health
expenses in our sample of Utah men differ from those in the Handel, Hendel, and Whinston (2015) sample,
as noted in the previous footnote.
39The No-Borrowing/No-Savings outcome is the same as the ACA outcome except that it provides 100%
coverage rather than unraveling to 60%; the difference between ∗ and  therefore reflects the
cost of adverse selection under the managed competition-style insurance exchange. Table 19 shows that
the cost of adverse selection ranges from roughly $750 per year for managers, downscaled managers, and
non-managers to roughly $1700 per year for consumer with flat net income profiles.
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benefits from dynamic contracts. In contrast, individuals with flat net income profiles prefer
dynamic contracts with insurance of pre-age-25 health risks to the managed competition-style
insurance exchange environment.
7 Extensions
In this section we consider several extensions. First, we consider how the presence of
switching costs would affect the gains from dynamic contracts. Second, we study how the
ability to engage in precautionary savings would affect our conclusions. Third, motivated
by the concern that risk aversion could differ from typical estimates in the health insurance
literature for the large losses created by reclassification risk, we examine the welfare effects
of dynamic contracts for lower levels of risk aversion than the level we have considered above.
7.1 Switching Costs
Recent evidence from health insurance markets [Handel (2013), Ho et al. (2016)] points to
substantial inertia in insurance choice. Switching costs have the potential to improve how
dynamic contracts perform. Our basic model assumes that consumers lapse whenever they
get a better offer. As discussed in Section 2.6, switching costs relax the lapsation constraints,
which can enhance commitment and the welfare achievable with optimal dynamic contracts.
(Introducing switching costs can also be viewed as allowing for imperfect access to credit
markets, since switching costs enable debt contracts by making consumers willing to repay
their debts rather than switch to another lender.)
Table 20 shows first and second-year consumption levels for a flat net income profile and
switching costs of $1,000 in the Utah male data. Comparing to Table 8, it is interesting to
note that for all second-year states without a binding lapsation constraint consumption is
higher with a higher switching cost, while consumption is lower for second-year states with a
binding lapsation constraint. Namely, conditional on a history, higher switching costs enable
transferring resources from the good to the bad states.
Table 21 shows the ex ante (at-birth) welfare achieved by dynamic contracts for different
levels of switching costs and our four income profiles in the male Utah sample. As expected,
welfare is monotonic in the switching cost. Qualitatively, as switching costs increase from zero
to infinity, welfare in the optimal dynamic contract with one-sided commitment approaches
the first-best (two-sided commitment) level.
Notice that it takes extremely large switching costs to achieve welfare close to first best for
consumers with steeply rising manager and downscaled-manager income profiles. The reason




24 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 consumption
1 1 54.816 54.816 54.816 54.816 54.816 54.816 54.816 54.816
2 2 54.305 53.986 53.986 53.986 53.986 53.986 53.986 53.986
3 3 54.227 53.453 53.340 53.340 53.340 53.340 53.340 53.340
4 4 54.698 54.105 52.714 51.214 51.214 51.214 51.214 51.214
5 5 54.770 54.277 53.318 50.945 45.947 45.947 45.947 45.947
6 6 54.819 54.502 53.985 51.499 45.784 43.661 43.661 43.661
7 7 54.783 54.699 54.519 52.194 41.359 42.371 36.996 36.996
Table 20: First and second-year consumptions (in $1,000s) for Utah men with switching
costs of $1,000, flat net income, and a constant absolute risk aversion coefficient equal to
0.0004.
Switching cost Flat net Non-manager Manager Downs mngr
0 48.83 38.08 45.91 28.13
0.1 48.85 38.13 45.98 28.19
1 49.02 38.54 46.60 28.69
5 49.67 39.89 48.63 30.31
10 50.37 41.13 50.46 31.79
50 53.37 47.06 58.95 38.92
100 54.15 51.47 65.58 44.57
500 54.19 54.19 84.51 54.19
∗ 54.67 54.67 85.00 54.67
∗ 54.67 47.37 55.67 37.68
Table 21: At-birth welfare (in $1,000s) for Utah men from optimal dynamic contracts ()
under discount factor of 0975 and risk aversion of 0.0004 for different levels of switching costs
and four income profiles.
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Table 22: Switching costs required to equalize certainty equivalents from optimal dynamic
contracts and the ACA insurance regime (in thousands of dollars). Computed using the
hybrid sample of Section 6, constant absolute risk aversion equal to 0.0004, and a discount
factor of 0.975.
when the income profile is steep. Thus, an extremely large switching cost is necessary to
achieve the first best. Somewhat more moderate switching costs deliver welfare close to the
no-borrowing/no-saving benchmark.
Using the same hybrid sample as in Section 6, Table 22 reports for each income profile the
switching cost that is needed to achieve the same level of welfare as the managed competition-
style insurance exchange we consider there. For a flat net income profile, switching costs of
$1,970 suffice, while for rising income profiles switching costs between $7,680-$10,470 make
dynamic contracts (without any pre-age-25 insurance) as good as the managed competition-
style insurance exchange. Handel (2013) estimates a mean switching cost of $2,032 in a
static model of choice for the same population as in our Handel, Hendel, and Whinston
(2015) sample. Since the dynamic gain from switching likely extends over multiple periods,
the comparable value for our model is likely significantly higher than this $2,032, and so
switching costs may well be in the range that make dynamic contracts (without insurance
of pre-age-25 health risk and with our baseline risk aversion) preferable to the managed
competition-style insurance exchange for some income profiles.40 41
7.2 Precautionary Savings
So far we have not allowed for savings in our welfare calculations. From Proposition 1
we know that this is without loss of generality for the case of optimal contracts with one-
sided commitment. Consumers also would not want to engage in savings in the first best.
However, with spot contracting consumers may want to engage in precautionary savings to
40Illanes (2017), for example, estimates a lower bound switching cost of $1200 in a dynamic model of choice
for the Chilean pension market; he shows that the estimate from a static model of choice in his sample is
$117.
41Note, however, that our ACA model assumes that there are no switching costs; modeling insurance
exchange competition with switching costs remains an open issue.
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lower the costs of reclassification risk. Individuals can save in good states to weather periods
of bad health.
To study the impact of precautionary savings we solve a finite-horizon savings problem,
with the same underlying fundamentals as in our main analysis, namely, the same income
profiles, risk preferences, and transition matrices. We find optimal savings starting at age
25 given an income profile and the actuarially fair health insurance premiums associated
with the different health states.42 Once we find optimal savings for each age and state, we
compute the certainty equivalent, which we denote by  ( = “Spot with
Savings”).
Table 23 shows the welfare effect of precautionary savings in the Utah male sample. As
the spot contracting with precautionary savings outcome is feasible in our dynamic problem
with one-sided commitment,  naturally lies between  and  Savings
enable the consumer to transfer resources to future periods, to be consumed in periods of
high marginal utility from consumption. While these precautionary savings reduce the losses
from reclassification risk, these losses remain very high, ranging between 13.8% and 26.2%
of lifetime certainty equivalent (see column (5)). Optimal dynamic contracts do better than
precautionary savings, as they allow for state-specific savings. By charging state-contingent
premiums the optimal contract enables equating consumption across all states in which the
lapsation does not bind.
Column (6) shows that precautionary savings closes a relatively small share — between
2.6% and 27.1% — of the welfare gap between spot contracts without savings and the no-
borrowing/no-saving benchmark. Column (7) shows the fraction of the welfare gap between
the no-borrowing/no-saving constrained first-best outcome and the spot contracting with
precautionary savings outcome that is closed by optimal dynamic contracts; this ranges
from 22.3% for flat net income profiles to 2.0% for downscaled managers.
7.3 Risk Aversion
So far our analysis has used the risk preferences estimated in Handel, Hendel, and Whin-
ston (2015). We now consider the robustness of the analysis with respect to the degree of
risk aversion. We are particularly interested in lower risk aversion. The reason is that we
42For each income profile, we solve a finite-horizon dynamic programming problem, from ages 25 to 65.
Starting at age 64, for a grid of saving values entering that period, the individual finds the optimal saving level
going into the last period that maximizes the sum of current utility from consumption and the discounted
value of the expected utility in the last period, where the expectation is taken for each state given the
transition matrices. Once we obtain the value function at age 64 for each possible health state and incoming
saving level, we proceed backwards all the way to age 25, where we obtain the discounted expected utility
starting in each possible health state. The ex-ante certainty equivalent is the certain consumption level that
makes the consumer indifferent to the expected utility of entering the dynamic problem before observing the
health realization at age 25.
42
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)














Flat net 54.50 44.18 46.98 48.66 0.138 0.271 0.223
Non-mngr 47.37 36.96 37.64 38.08 0.205 0.065 0.046
Manager 55.67 45.44 45.71 45.91 0.179 0.026 0.020
Downs Mngr 37.68 27.35 27.83 28.13 0.262 0.046 0.031
Table 23: Long-run welfare of Utah men allowing for precautionary savings under spot
contracts, with a constant absolute risk aversion coefficient of 0.0004. Welfare measures
in columns (1)—(4) are reported in thousands of dollars. The certainty equivalent of spot
contracting with precautionary savings is denoted by .
are afraid our estimate of risk preferences, estimated from choices among health insurance
contracts with out-of-pocket caps, might not reflect consumers’ risk tolerance for the larger
stakes associated with reclassification risk.43
Table 24 presents the welfare comparisons for risk aversion of 000008, five times lower
than that in our main analysis. For a consumer with $50,000 of consumption, this corre-
sponds to a CRRA risk aversion coefficient of 4, roughly the level suggested in the macro
literature on consumption disasters (e.g., Barro (2006)). To put the coefficients in per-
spective, consider a lottery that assigns the costs associated with each of the seven health
statuses, with each having equal probability. For the costs we used in Section 6, our 0.0004
risk aversion coefficient estimate implies a willingness to pay of $7,222 to avoid the uncer-
tainty associated with this risky prospect. Instead, the lower risk aversion coefficient leads
to a willingness to pay of $1,491.
Lowering risk aversion substantially reduces the loss associated with reclassification risk
(captured by the gap between ∗ and  ). The loss is between 1.8% and 3.1%,
depending on the income profile. For the higher 0.0004 risk aversion, the loss was between
18.4% and 27.4%. Still, a loss of 1-4% of age 25-65 certainty equivalent is not insubstantial.
While the loss from reclassification risk is lower, the reductions in reclassification risk from
long-term contracting, as captured in column (6) by how much of the gap between the welfare
under optimal dynamic contracts and that under the No-Borrowing/No-Saving benchmark,
are much larger, ranging between 25.6% for the manager income profile and 82.7% for the flat
net income profile. Still, with rising income profiles, dynamic contracts without insurance of
pre-age-25 health risk leave consumers facing a high share of the reclassification risk.
43See Rabin (2000) for a discussion of issues with CARA and scaling of gambles, and Collier et al (2017)
for evidence of differing risk aversion for small versus large stakes decisions.
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Flat net 54.67 52.99 54.38 54.67 0.031 0.827 0.827
Non-mngr 54.67 51.22 52.05 52.72 0.028 0.550 0.239
Manager 85.00 68.45 68.78 69.73 0.018 0.256 0.020
Downs Mngr 54.67 46.44 46.95 47.81 0.029 0.372 0.062
Table 24: Long-run welfare results for Utah men showing the certainty equivalent consump-
tion of different insurance institutions for a discount factor of 0975 and constant absolute
risk aversion equal to 000008.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a theoretical characterization of optimal dynamic health
insurance contracts, shown how to compute these contracts given estimates of primitives
(the stochastic health process, consumer income paths, and interest rate), and examined
the structure and welfare levels of empirically relevant dynamic contracts using granular
all-payers data from Utah.
Among our findings, we show that the welfare that optimal dynamic health insurance
contracts could offer for men in Utah depends crucially on (i) whether there is government
insurance of pre-age-25 health risk and (ii) the steepness of consumer income profiles. A lack
of pre-age-25 risk insurance greatly reduces the appeal of dynamic contracts, while, whether
or not such insurance is in place, the appeal of these contracts is greater if lifetime income
profiles are flatter. With pre-age-25 health risk insurance in place, consumers with flat net
income prefer dynamic contracts to the managed competition-style exchange environment we
study, but consumers with steeper income profiles prefer the managed competition exchange
environment. When we allow for meaningful switching cost (as empirical work has shown are
relevant in practice) or lower risk aversion levels dynamic contracts become more attractive.
These results illustrate that there are certain plausible scenarios where dynamic con-
tracts could improve welfare relative to an ACA-like managed competition-style insurance
exchange. However, in practice, unlike in auto insurance or life insurance, explicitly dynamic
contracts have been very rare in US health insurance markets.44 There are some potential
44However, as we noted in the Introduction, in most states, prior to the ACA insurers faced guaranteed
renewability regulations that prevented them from re-pricing a policy to continuing customers on an indi-
vidual basis [Patel and Pauly (2002)], and such regulations did limit the reclassification risk that consumers
faced once enrolled in a policy [Marquis and Buntin (2006), Herring and Pauly (2006), Herring, Song, and
Pauly (2008)]. Fleitas, Gowrisannkaran, and Losasso (2018) document a similar fact for the small group
insurance market.
44
practical impediments that are outside the scope of our model that could limit the viability
of such contracts, which we now discuss.
One concern is that firms may have difficulty forecasting future medical cost levels, an
issue that does not arise in markets such as life insurance in which long-term contracts are
prevalent. This risk is not fully diversifiable.45 This issue could be solved (alleviated), by
indexing future guaranteed premiums to medical cost inflation indices in a granular manner,
something that, e.g., is currently done in the German private health insurance market.
Another potential problem is that consumer lock-in might lead to quality degradation
by insurers. This is something that was a major concern in the pre-ACA individual market
for insured consumers with pre-existing conditions. While there are a number of ways to
regulate product quality (on financial and non-financial dimensions) this is a concern that
is potentially difficult to fully resolve. Cutting against this concern is the possibility that
insurers’ quality incentives would actually be enhanced on some dimensions, as they would
have increased incentives to promote long-term health. Lock-in could also reduce a con-
sumer’s ability to re-match with firms if firm-specific preferences change (Atal (2015)). This
problem would be greatly reduced if health insurance products were purely financial.
The most serious limitation on the use and benefits of dynamic contracts in the U.S. is the
short durations of insurance need in the individual market. Given the current tax-advantage
for employer-based insurance, consumers may arrive only when old, or in between jobs. For
example, in the pre-ACA world, while some consumers purchased individual insurance over
long periods of time, many others used it as a short-term solution between employment
spells, leading median duration in the individual market in one study to be less than two
years [Marquis et al. (2006); see also Herring, Song, and Pauly (2008)].46 The same is
currently true of the ACA individual market exchanges. Short durations greatly reduce the
benefits of a long-term contract.47 In addition, those older consumers newly arriving to the
individual market with pre-existing conditions (perhaps because of a job loss) would still
face reclassification risk, much as in our discussion of unhealthy 25 year-old consumers in
Section 5.1, perhaps necessitating some sort of government insurance (such as high-risk pool
subsidies). Removing the employer tax exemption for health insurance is one oft-discussed
policy that would help promote the robustness of the individual market, whether in the ACA
exchanges or in an individual market for dynamic contracts like we consider here.
45The need to forecast could also introduce “winner’s curse” type concerns, as firms who attract a lot of
business would tend to be those whose forecasts of future medical cost inflation are unreasonably low.
46These short durations may partly explain the apparent absence in the US of explictly dynamic contracts
in the pre-ACA world.
47Introducing an exogenous probability of break up into our model is equivalent to lowering the discount
rate, provided that separation payments upon break up cannot be made. With a discount factor of 0.5
(which generates an expected duration of 2 years), optimal dynamic contracts close only 8.4% of the gap
between spot contracts and the no-borrowing/no-savings benchmark for a consumer with flat net income.
45
In summary, our analysis shows scenarios under which long-term dynamic contracts may
be welfare improving relative to a range of alternatives. In practice, several complementary
regulations are likely important to help such contracts flourish. One key factor in our analy-
sis that helps dynamic contracts, which was not present pre-ACA, is government insurance
of pre-age-25 health risk. Such insurance is crucial to prevent consumers from facing signif-
icant pre-age-25 reclassification risk. Outside of our model, it is clear that, as for the ACA
exchanges, removing the employer tax exemption will improve robustness of the individual
market and meaningfully increase the length of consumer spells in that market. As this
suggests, extending our analysis to allow for multiple market layers (e.g. employer markets,
Medicare, Medicaid) that exist alongside an individual market with dynamic contracts is an
important avenue for future work.
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9 Appendix A: Characterization of Equilibrium Con-
tracts with One-Sided Commitment
To recount some basics from the main text: We suppose that there are a total of  periods,
 = 1   . The consumer’s within-period utility function is (·). It is strictly increasing
and strictly concave. Health expenses in period  are denoted . The consumer’s health
status in period  is , which determines his period- expected medical expenses, E(|).
The consumer’s income in period  is . We assume that the consumer’s utility function (·)
and income path (1   ) are known. The consumer also has a switching cost incurred
whenever he changes insurers, equal to  ≥ 0. (We will establish our proposition for the
general case of a nonnegative switching cost; Proposition 1 will follow as the special case of
 = 0.)
We denote by Λ0 the consumer’s history of health statuses from period  to period 
0, Λ0 ≡
(  0). Similarly, the consumer’s history of medical expense realizations from period 
to period 0 is 0 ≡ ( 0). We will refer to Λ0 as the consumer’s “continuation health
history” starting at period . At the start of period , the probability of the continuation
49
health history Λ0 being reached depends only on the consumer’s health history at period ,
Λ1 , which we refer to as the consumer’s period- “health state,” and is given by (Λ

0|Λ1 ).48











We are concerned with identifying optimal contracts that may be signed at each date and
history. Since at the start of a period  the future depends only on the consumer’s health
state Λ1 , an optimal contract will depend only this, and not on previous medical expense
realizations. We therefore denote a contract signed with the consumer at health history
Λ1 by Λ1 (·).49 The contract Λ1 (·) is a function that specifies the consumer’s consumption
level in each future period 0 ≥  for each possible continuation history (Λ+10+1 0).50 Thus,






It will be useful in what follows to consider contracts that would break even if subsidized
by some amount. To this effect, we say that contract Λ1 (·) breaks even with subsidy  ∈ R
if
Σ=
− ¡[ − E[ |Λ1 ]− E[Λ1 (Λ+1+1 )|Λ1 ]¢ = − (8)
We say that the contract is a “zero profit contract” if it breaks even with subsidy  = 0, and
we denote the set of all contracts signed at Λ1 that break even with subsidy  by 
(Λ1 ).
The value to the consumer of contract Λ1 (·) starting at health state Λ1 is denoted
Λ1 (Λ1 (·)) and is defined as follows:
Λ1 (Λ1 (·)) = Σ=−[E[(Λ1 (Λ+1+1 ))|Λ1 ] (9)
For 0  , we denote by Λ1 |Λ+10
(·) a “sub-contract” of Λ1 (·) that is given by looking at
the consumption levels implied by Λ1 (·) (weakly) after the realization of continuation health
history Λ+10 . Mathematically, Λ1 |Λ+10
(·) could also be looked at as a stand-alone contract






. Obviously, Λ1 |Λ+10
(·) being
zero-profit neither implies nor is implied by Λ1 (·) being zero-profit.
48In our empirical work we suppose that (·|·) is a second-order Markov process, generated by a transition
process b(+1|−1 ). As such, we will then refer to Λ = (−1 ) as the consumer’s period- health
state.
49In this appendix, we suppress the dependence of the contract on the consumer’s type , consisting of his
utility function (·) and income path  = ( 1  ).
50Recall that +1 and  are realized during period  and the consumption specified for period  can
depend on them.
50




(·|) is an optimal contract signed in period  at health state Λ1 with






Λ1 (Λ1 (·)) (10)
 hΛ1 Λ+10 i(Λ1 |Λ+10 (·)) ≥ hΛ1 Λ+10 i(
∗




In what follows, we will denote the special case of ∗
Λ1
(·|0) (the optimal zero-profit con-
tract) by ∗
Λ1
(·) for simplicity. Also, ∗
Λ1 |Λ+10
(·|) is the subcontract of optimal contract
∗
Λ1
(·|) that starts in period 0 at history ­Λ1 Λ+10 ®; ∗Λ1 |Λ+10 (·) is the special case of a
subcontract of zero-profit optimal contract ∗
Λ1
(·).
Note that equation (10) provides a recursive definition of the optimal contract. The
constraint in this definition makes sure that at no continuation health history Λ+10 does the





with non-positive subsidy − ≤ 0. The non-positive subsidy comes from the fact
that an insurer seeking to lure the consumer away from the contract ∗
Λ1
(·|) must effectively
compensate the consumer for the fact that he incurs the switching cost .51 The constraint
ensures us that, following the realization of continuation health history Λ0, the consumer
does not prefer to lapse to any other contract (Λ1 Λ
+1
0 )
(·) that would at least break even
given the need to compensate the consumer for his switching cost, and that also satisfies
no-lapsation.
To begin, we first prove a lemma demonstrating that an optimal contract signed in a
period  always specifies at each period 0 ≥  and continuation health history Λ0 a deter-
ministic consumption level; that is, consumption that does not depend upon the realization
during period 0 of the consumer’s period 0+1 health status, nor the consumer’s continuation
medical expenses from period  to 0 0. In particular, upon arriving at any period 
0 and
continuation health history Λ0, the contract offers the consumer full within-period insurance
against his period 0 medical expenses.





0|) = ∗Λ1 (Λ
+1
0 |)
51The consumption level specified in the contract offered by the new insurer is net of the consumer’s
switching cost.
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(bΛ+10+1c 0) with Λ+10 = bΛ+10 ≡ Λ+10 that can both happen with positive probability condi-





0|) 6= ∗Λ1 (bΛ+10+1c 0|)
We show that one could then construct a contract that is strictly preferred by the cus-
tomer to ∗
Λ1
(·|) and does not violate no-lapsation or the budget constraint. To do this, we










































Given that the utility function (·) is strictly concave, this consumption-smoothing
modification will imply that the customer strictly prefers Λ1 (·) over ∗Λ1 (·|). Also, this mod-
ification does not change the contract’s expected profit. Finally, this modification weakly
improves the expected utility of the contract at all possible super-histories of Λ1 . Thus,
contract Λ1 (·) also satisfies no-lapsation. But this contradicts the optimality of ∗Λ1 (·|).¥
Given lemma (2), we can simplify notation and write contracts in the form of Λ1 (Λ
+1
0 |).
However, in what follows it will actually be more convenient and clearer (despite some







that has been reached at date 0 ≥ ; hence in the form of Λ1 (Λ10|).
We introduce two more notations on comparing contracts to one another before we turn
to the proposition and its proof. First, for two contracts Λ1 (·) and ̂Λ1 (·) offered at the same
health state Λ1 , we say the former is “preferred” to the latter, and write Λ1 (·) º ̂Λ1 (·) if
Λ1 (Λ1 (·)) ≥ Λ1 (̂Λ1 (·)).
Second, for two contracts signed at the same health state Λ1 , we say Λ1 (·) “dominates”
̂Λ1 (·), and write Λ1 (·) ≥ ̂Λ1 (·), if the former offers a weakly higher consumption level than
the latter at any possible future health history, including period . That is, for every 0 ≥ 






with (Λ+10 |Λ1 )  0, we have Λ1 (Λ10) ≥ ̂Λ1 (Λ10). Note that if
Λ1 (·) ≥ ̂Λ1 (·), then for any 0   and Λ+10 we have Λ1 |Λ+10 (·) ≥ ̂Λ1 |Λ+10 (·).
52
The strict versions of the above two relationships (i.e. Â and ) are defined in the natural
way.
52The same need not be true for º.
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9.2 Proposition and Proof
We establish the following result, from which Proposition 1 follows as the special case where
the switching cost  equals zero.53
Proposition 3 The optimal contract ∗
Λ1
(·) is fully characterized by the zero-profit condition
and, for all 0   and Λ0 such that (Λ

0|Λ1 )  0, the condition that the consumer receives
the following certain consumption level:
∗Λ1 (Λ
1











In words, the optimal contract ∗
Λ1






the maximum among the first-period consumption levels offered by all the equilibrium con-
tracts available along the way on continuation health history Λ+10 .
The proof strategy is based on strong induction: We assume the proposition is true for
the optimal contracts ∗
Λ1
0
(·) at all Λ10 with 0  , and then show it is also true for the period-
optimal contracts ∗
Λ1
(·) for any Λ1 . To establish the result, we show that if for some Λ1 ,
optimal contract ∗
Λ1
(·) does not satisfy (11), then there is a “modification of” ∗
Λ1
(·) that (i)
is strictly preferred to ∗
Λ1
(·) by the consumer; and (ii) satisfies no-lapsation and zero-profit.
Before we get to the proof itself, we introduce a notation on how to “modify” a contract.
Definition 3 Let min{0 00} ≥ . We say contract ̂Λ1 (·) is an -transfer, from Λ10 to Λ100,
on contract Λ1 (·), and write ̂Λ1 (·) = tr[Λ1 (·) Λ10 Λ100 ] if:
1. ̂Λ1 (Λ
1
















3. For all  ≥  and Λ ∈ {Λ0 Λ00}, we have ̂Λ1 (Λ) = Λ1 (Λ)
In words, this -transfer just transfers some consumption between health histories Λ10 and
Λ100 after applying a multiplier to the transfer to keep the discounted expected consumption
unchanged. Our improvements on ∗
Λ1
(·) in the counter-positive strategy will be constructed
using -transfers. We record two facts about such transfers:
Remark 1 -transfers preserve the expected discounted profit: If ∗
Λ1
(·) ∈ (Λ1 ) for some
 ∈ R, then tr[Λ1 (·) Λ10 Λ100 ] ∈ (Λ1 ).
53The proof in this subsection assumes the consumer does not engage in secret savings; we establish this
fact formally in Appendix B.
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Remark 2 For every Λ0 and Λ

00 with Λ1 (Λ
1
0)  Λ1 (Λ
1
00) there exists an 0  0 such that
for all  ≤ 0 we have tr[Λ1 (·) Λ0 Λ00 ] Â Λ1 (·).
Remark 1 follows immediately from the fact that the -transfer does not change the
expected discounted consumption in the contract, while Remark 2 follows because of the
consumer is strictly risk averse [(·) is strictly concave].
Before proceeding to the proof of the proposition, we observe that in any optimal contract,
the continuation contract specified at every future health history must itself be an optimal
contract starting at that history for some subsidy:
Claim 1 For 0  , define 0 as the expected loss sustained by the insurer under contract
∗
Λ1

















® |)−  − |Λ10 ]´ 
Then, the following is true:
∗
Λ1 |Λ+10
(·|) = ∗hΛ1 Λ+10 i(·|0) (12)
where
In words, Claim 1 states that any continuation contract ∗
Λ1 |Λ+10
(·|) of ∗Λ1 (·|) is in fact






when the subsidy available to the consumer is exactly the amount 0.
Proof of Claim 1. If at any continuation history Λ0 the condition in the claim did
not hold we could replace the continuation contract ∗
Λ1 |Λ+10
(·|) by ∗hΛ1 Λ+10 i(·|0) and
do strictly better for the consumer without violating no-lapsation or changing the required
subsidy  for contract 
∗
Λ1
(·|), a contradiction to the optimality of ∗Λ1 (·|). ¥
We now turn to proving the proposition. To do so, we will actually prove a more
general statement than the proposition, using strong induction on the number of periods.
The following lemma is the general result that implies our proposition:
Lemma 3 Consider optimal contract ∗
Λ1
(·|). There exists a unique ̄ ∈ R such that
∗
Λ1






® |) = max{̄ ∗hΛ1 +1i(­Λ1 Λ+10 ® |− )} (13)
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(·|) gives the larger value between (i) consumption that it immediately gives, and (ii) the
consumption that the optimal, break-even contract with subsidy − signed in the beginning
of period + 1 at history hΛ1  +1i would offer.
Note that condition (13) of the lemma implies that any two optimal contracts signed




, are ordered by the
dominance relation according to the level of the inital consumptions they specify, which
by the break-even condition are ordered according to the size of the subsidies; that is,
∗
Λ1
(·|00 )  ∗Λ1 (·|
0
).
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof goes by induction. For  =  , the result is straightfor-
ward, given that there is no period after  =  ; at that point, Λ1

(Λ1 |) = −E[ | ]+.
We now turn to the proof for    , assuming, by way of induction, that the result holds
for any    and any  . We begin by showing that (13) holds for any period + 1 history




® |) = max{∗Λ1 (Λ1 |) ∗hΛ1 +1i(­Λ1  +1® |− )} (14)
To this end, we consider two cases regarding history nodes ending at period + 1.




Λ1 |+1(·|)) = Λ1 (
∗
hΛ1 +1i(·|− )) (15)
Note that by Claim 1, the continuation contract ∗
Λ1 |Λ+10
(·|) is itself the optimal contract
∗hΛ1 +1i(·|+1) for some +1. Thus, (15) implies that
∗Λ1 |+1(·|) = 
∗
hΛ1 +1i(·|− ) (16)
Next, note that the immediate consumption ∗
Λ1
(Λ1 |) in contract ∗Λ1 (·|) must satisfy
∗Λ1 (Λ
1
 |) ≤ ∗Λ1 (
­
Λ1  +1
® |) = ∗hΛ1 +1i(­Λ1  +1® |− ), (17)
otherwise an -transfer from the immediate consumption at history Λ1 to history hΛ1  +1i
would strictly improve the contract ∗
Λ1
(·|) from the perspective of the consumer, without
changing the expected profit. This transfer would also satisfy no-lapsation, given that it
weakly increases the consumption given by ∗
Λ1
(·|) at any history that happens strictly
after time . Thus, (14) holds at all period-(+ 1) histories at which lapsation binds.
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Λ1 |+1(·|))  Λ1 (
∗
hΛ1 +1i(·|− )) (18)
As in the previous case, given Claim 1, the continuation contract ∗
Λ1 |+1(·|) is itself the
optimal contract ∗hΛ1 +1i(·|+1) for some +1. Therefore, by our induction assumption,
there is some ̄ such that (i) ̄ = ∗
Λ1 |+1(hΛ
1












® |) = max{̄ ∗hΛ1 +1i(­∆1  +1Λ+20 ® |− )} (19)
But this, combined with inequality (18), tells us it must be that
̄  ∗hΛ1 +1i(
­
Λ1  +1
® |− ) (20)
We now claim that
̄ = ∗Λ1 (Λ
1
 |). (21)
That is, ̄ is equal to the immediate consumption offered by contract ∗
Λ1
(·|). To see this,
note that if ̄  ∗
Λ1
(Λ1 |), then an -transfer from the history (Λ1  +1) to the immediate
history Λ1 will increase the consumer’s expected utility, will not change the expected profit
from the contracts, and will preserve no-lapsation if  is small enough, given (18). This con-
tradicts the assumption that ∗
Λ1
(·|) is the optimal contract. Conversely, if ̄  ∗Λ1 (Λ
1
 |),
the reverse -transfer will strictly increase the consumer’s expected utility and preserve the
insurer’s expected profit. It also preserves no-lapsation since it weakly increases consumption
at any history strictly after Λ1 . Thus, (14) also holds at all period-(+1) histories at which
lapsation does not bind.
To sum up, cases 1 and 2 show that for any history +1, no matter whether no-lapsation
is binding or not, (14) holds. Next, we combine (14) with the induction assumption to extend



















® |) = ∗hΛ1 +1i(­Λ1  +1Λ+20 ® |+1) (23)
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® |+1) = max{∗hΛ1 +1i(­Λ1  +1® |+1) ∗hΛ1 +1+2i(­Λ1  +1Λ+20 ® |−)}
(24)






® |) = max{∗Λ1 (­Λ1  +1® |) ∗hΛ1 +1+2i(­Λ1  +1Λ+20 ® |− )}
(25)
Now, substituting for ∗
Λ1









 |) ∗(Λ1 +1)(
­
Λ1  +1






® |− ) ∗hΛ1 +1+2i(­Λ1  +1Λ+20 ® |− )}}






); substituting this into (26) tells us that (13) holds for contracts signed in period . Ap-
plying induction establishes the lemma.¥
Proof of Proposition 3. Applying Lemma 3 to the special case of  = 0, we get that
for any Λ1 and Λ
+1
0 such that (Λ
+1

























in the same way as above. Then we can do this again and again, until we get that for all
0   and Λ0 such that (Λ

0|Λ1 )  0,
∗Λ1 (Λ
1






 )|− )} (27)
which is exactly the statement made in the proposition.¥
10 Appendix B: Self-Selection
In this appendix we prove Proposition 2. We first establish the following Lemma:
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Lemma 4 Let  = (    ) and b = (b   b ) be guaranteed premium paths (that start
in period ) such that b ≥  and consider a type  consumer who is in health state Λ1 in
period  . Suppose that (i) the insurer earns a non-negative expected payoff when guaranteed
premium path  is chosen by the consumer (given the consumer’s subsequent optimal lapsation
behavior), (ii) under premium path , in every period    and health state Λ1 in which
the consumer optimally does not lapse, the insurer’s expected continuation payoff is non-
positive, and (iii) the consumer never secretly saves when facing either of these premium
paths. Then the insurer’s expected continuation payoff is non-negative if premium path b is
chosen in period  by the consumer.
Proof. Let (Λ1 ) and
b(Λ1 ) denote the type  consumer’s continuation payoff in
period  at health state Λ1 given optimal lapsation behavior under  and b respectively. Let
() and b() denote the sets of health states at which the consumer optimally lapses
in period , under  and b respectively; () and b() are the complementary sets of
health states at which the consumer does not lapse. Finally, let Π(Λ1 ) and
bΠ(Λ1 ) denote
the insurer’s expected continuation payoff at (Λ1 ) given the consumer’s optimal lapsation
behavior under  and b respectively. Assumption (i) therefore says that Π(   ) ≥ 0, while
assumption (ii) says that Π(Λ1 ) ≤ 0 if    and Λ1 ∈ () [of course, Π(Λ1 ) = 0 for
all Λ1 ∈ ()].
Note, first, that (Λ1 ) ≥ b(Λ1 ) for all (Λ1 ): starting in period , the consumer who
faces  could adopt the same lapsation behavior as when facing b and receive a weakly higher
continuation payoff since under  he would be facing lower premia, and his optimal lapsation
behavior under  yields a still higher payoff.54 Next, the fact that (Λ1 ) ≥ b(Λ1 ) for
all (Λ1 ) implies that () ⊆ b(): in any health state in which the consumer lapses in
period  when facing , he also lapses when facing b. Finally, consider the expected payoff of
the insurer starting at ( Λ1) under . This is the probability weighted average of the payoffs
achieved along the various possible sequences of health states (Λ1  Λ
1
 ). For each sequence
the insurer earns premiums and incurs costs until the consumer lapses. Since () ⊆ b(),
each such sequence hits lapsation weakly earlier under b than under . Since, under path
, Π(Λ1 ) ≤ 0 if    and Λ1 ∈ (), the earlier termination behavior under b (but
earning the same premiums  prior to lapsation) would weakly raise the expected payoff
earned by the insurer for the sequence by changing a non-positive expected continuation
payoff into a continuation payoff of zero. Moreover, the fact that the premiums earned until
lapsation are higher under b than under , while the expected costs are the same, means
that a change from premium path  to path b, holding lapsation behavior fixed at b, would
54Note that the consumer who lapses in a period  when in some health state Λ1 would receive the same
new contract regardless of whether he was lapsing from  or from b.
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further raise the insurer’s expected payoff earned from this health state sequence. As a
result, Π( Λ1) ≤ bΠ( Λ1).
We next establish the following Lemma:
Lemma 5 Suppose that in each period  ≥  the menu of contracts offered to a consumer
who is in health state Λ1 and wishes to sign a new contract is the set of optimal guaranteed
premium path contracts for that consumer, {∗ (Λ1 )}∈Θ, and that moreover, in each period
   this menu is self-selective and induces no secret savings. Then a type  consumer in





Proof. Observe first that, under the assumptions of this lemma, if the consumer does
not secretly save and then lapses in period    when in health state Λ1 his new insurance
contract will have guaranteed premium path ∗ (Λ
1




)−∆(Λ1 ) for some∆(Λ1 ) ∈
R.55 Thus, he will optimally lapse in that period and state if and only if ∆(Λ1 )  0; that
is, he lapses if and only if he gets a cheaper guaranteed premium path.
Next, we argue that if the consumer instead secretly saves under contract ∗ (Λ
1
), then
he will optimally lapse whenever he would have if he did not secretly save (and possibly
in additional states as well). To see this point, suppose that the consumer has secretly
saved prior to arriving in period  in health state Λ1 and he chooses not to lapse when he
would have if he had not secretly saved. Then he would be better off instead lapsing and
choosing the same new contract choice as if he had not secretly saved (choosing the cheaper
guranteed premium contract that he would have lapsed to if he had not secretly saved), while
keeping his future lapsation and savings behavior unchanged: doing so would only change
his realized utility until the next lapsation, and would raise his payoff until that point in
time by lowering his premiums.
Next, since in an optimal contract the insurer’s continuation profits are always non-
positive, by hastening lapsation secret savings can only raise the profit of the insurer offering
the consumer contract ∗ (Λ
1
). Moreover, the assumptions of the lemma imply that (be-
cause of self-selection and no future secret savings) all insurers providing the consumer with
insurance after lapsation from contract ∗ (Λ
1
) will earn zero.
56 Thus, the total profit of
insurers is non-negative with secret savings.
Finally, since total insurer profit is non-negative (and continuation profits are never
strictly positive), the consumption path that results from secret savings was feasible in the
55That is, the new guaranteed premium path will differ from the old one by the same amount in each
period (starting in period ).
56Note that a consumer with utility function  who arrives in period  in health state Λ1 with savings
 and who has remaining income path  = (   ) is equivalent to a consumer who has income path
 ≡ ( +    ) ∈ Θ and will self-select the policy intended for type  = (  ).
59
no-secret savings problem. Hence, secret savings cannot raise the consumer’s discounted
expected utility and therefore the consumer will not prefer to secretly save.
We next establish the following Lemma:
Lemma 6 Suppose that in each period  ≥  the menu of contracts offered to a consumer
who is in health state Λ1 and wishes to sign a new contract is the set of optimal guaranteed
premium path contracts, {∗ (Λ1 )}∈Θ, and that moreover, in each period    this menu is
self-selective and induces no secret savings. Then an insurer earns a non-negative continu-
ation expected discounted profit if in period  type 0 consumer in health state Λ1 chooses the
guaranteed premium path ∗ (Λ
1
) that is intended for a type  consumer in health state Λ
1
 .
Proof. The proof is by induction. Consider the following induction hypothesis:
Induction Hypothesis: Under contract ∗ (Λ
1
 ), if starting in period    the consumer
has not yet lapsed, lapsation behavior of type 0 starting in period  is either (A) the
same as for type  (meaning, it is the same after any history of health states between
periods  and  and sequence of decisions not to lapse), or (B) different and raises the
continuation expected discounted profit of the insurer starting in period  compared to
the continuation payoff the insurer receives when facing a type  consumer.
Observe that the Induction Hypothesis holds if  =  , since then lapsation behavior is
the same for type 0 as for type  — both types lapse if and only if [ | ]   , where 
is the last period price in guaranteed premium path ∗ (Λ
1
) ≡ (    ).
Now suppose that the Induction Hypothesis holds for periods    , and consider period
 − 1 (≥  + 1) after some previous history of health states and a sequence of decisions in
which the consumer has not yet lapsed. Recall that by Lemma 5 the type  consumer does
not secretly save; however, the type 0 consumer may.
Suppose first that, under ∗ (Λ
1
), period − 1 lapsation behavior is different for type 0
than for type  in a health state Λ1−1 in which type  would not lapse. Then lapsation by
type 0 in state Λ1−1 would remove a continuation that had a weakly negative continuation
payoff for the insurer when facing type  and replace it with a zero continuation payoff when
facing type 0.
Suppose, instead, that state Λ1−1 is one in which type  would lapse in period  − 1,
choosing a contract with premium path b, while type 0 does not lapse. We will show
that this changes what would have been a zero payoff continuation for the insurer into a
continuation with a non-negative expected payoff when facing type 0. By the self-selection
assumption, we know that the contract b that type  chooses is ∗−1(Λ1−1), the optimal
guaranteed premium path contract for that consumer, so the insurer offering that contract
breaks even. Note now that since that contract induces the type  consumer to lapse there
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is a ∆  0 such that b =  − ∆ for all periods  ≥  − 1 (this is true because the two
guaranteed premium paths differ only in offering different initial premiums and then the
premium change each period equals the change in the type ’s income). Hence, by Lemma
4, if the type  consumer were instead not to lapse from path ∗ (Λ
1
) ≡ (    ) in this
state, the insurer’s expected continuation payoff would be non-negative. But the Induction
Hypothesis then implies that it is also non-negative when the type 0 consumer does not
lapse in this state: the insurer’s payoffs in period − 1 from the two types are the same as
both the premium paid and the expected medical costs are the same for the two types. The
transitions to the period  state Λ1 are also the same. But, by the Induction Hypothesis,
the insurer’s expected continuation payoff under contract ∗ (Λ
1
 ) is weakly higher starting
in period  when facing the type 0 consumer than when facing a type  consumer. So the
Induction Hypothesis holds in period −1, and hence — applying induction — in period  +1.
Finally, consider period  . The argument is similar to that above: If a type 0 consumer




) intended for a type  consumer in
health state Λ1 , the insurer’s first period costs are the same as if a type  consumer in health
state Λ1 had chosen that contract, and the transitions to health states in the next period are
the same as well. If the lapsation behavior starting in period +1 were the same, the insurer
would break even. But, we have just concluded that if the lapsation behavior is different,
the insurer’s expected continuation payoff must be weakly higher. Thus, the insurer must
have a non-negative expected payoff when a type 0 consumer in health state Λ1 chooses
contract ∗ (Λ
1
) in period  .
We now prove Proposition 2:
Proof. of Proposition 2: We suppose that, in each period  = 1   , the menu of
optimal guaranteed premium path contracts {∗ (Λ1 )}∈ΘΛ1∈ is offered, where ∗ (Λ1 ) ≡
{− ∗ (Λ1 )}=1. The proof is by induction. Consider the following induction hypothesis.
Induction Hypothesis: In each period    the menu is self-selective and induces no
secret savings: that is, if a consumer of type  agrees to a new contract he chooses that
type’s optimal contract  () and engages in no secret savings.
The hypothesis is clearly true for  =  − 1, as given any previous history the menu
{ (Λ1 )} is a singleton with  = E[ | ], and hence necessarily self-selective, while there
is no possibility of secret savings as period  is the last period. Now suppose it is true
for some  ; we argue that it is then also true for  − 1. Lemma 5 implies that a type 




−1) in period  − 1 will not secretly save.
From Lemma 6 we know that if a type  consumer chooses in period  − 1 when in health
state Λ1−1 the contract intended for him then insurers break even, but if he chooses instead
61
the contract intended for type 0 then insurers earn non-negative profits (all future insurers
break even in both cases). But the policy intended for the type  consumer maximizes the
type  consumer’s discounted expected utility subject to the constraint that insurers at least
break-even (and the constraint that continuation profits can never be strictly positive). The
policy intended for type 0 was therefore feasible for type , which implies that it cannot be
preferred by type .
Applying induction, the menu {∗ (Λ11)}∈ΘΛ11∈1 is self-selective and induces no secret
savings.
11 Appendix C: PKH premiums and Cochrane con-
tracts
In this appendix we discuss further PKH guaranteed renewable contracts, and also Cochrane
(1995)’s premuium insurance scheme. We end by discussing the empirical difference in initial
premia and welfare between these contracts and our optimal contracts.
To begin, we first derive a general formula (for arbitrary  ) for the premia in a PKH
guaranteed renewable contract. We show that, in the context of our model, these policies
provide a consumer who starts at age 25 in the healthiest possible state with the guaranteed
consumption path { − }=1, where the period  premium  is (in anticipation of our
empirical analysis where the health process is second-order Markov, we denote by Λ =
(−1 ) = (1 1) the healthiest possible state in period ):57
 = E[|Λ = (1 1)] +
X

−{E[ |Λ = (1 1)]− E[ |Λ+1 = (1 1)]} for  = 1  
(28)
To this end, consider one-period contracts signed in each period  in return for the
premium (Λ) paid at signing that does the following:
• fully insures period  health expenses
• if    , pays in addition the amount +1(Λ+1) − +1(1 1) [where +1(1 1) is the
period + 1 premium for the healthiest period + 1 health state, Λ+1 = (1 1), at the
start of the next period + 1].
These contracts pay an amount that guarantees that the insured’s outlays for the next
period contract (net of the insurance payout from the previous period) always equal the
amount that the healthiest type would pay.
57PKH focus on the case in which the consumer starts in the healthiest possible state.
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The premiums for these contracts will in equilibrium be:
 (Λ ) = E[ |Λ ]
and for    ,
(Λ) = E[|Λ] + E{+1(Λ+1)− +1(1 1)|Λ}
Lemma 7 For all , (Λ) = E[|Λ]+
P
 
−{E[ (Λ)|Λ]−E[ (Λ)|Λ+1 = (1 1)]}
Proof. Clearly true in period  . Suppose it is true for all periods   . To see it is
true in period  , we substitute and use the Law of Iterated Expectations:
(Λ) = E[|Λ] + {E[+1(Λ+1)|Λ]− +1(1 1)}
= E[|Λ] + E{E[+1|Λ+1] +
X
+1
−(+1){E[(Λ)|Λ+1]− E[(Λ)|Λ+2 = (1 1)]|Λ}
−{E[+1|Λ+1 = (1 1)] +
X
+1
−(+1){E[ (Λ)|Λ+1 = (1 1)]− E[(Λ)|Λ+2 = (1 1)]}




−{E[+1|Λ+1 = (1 1)] +
X
+1




−{E[(Λ)|Λ]− E[ (Λ)|Λ+1 = (1 1)]}
Cochrane (1995) proposes a different scheme to protect consumers from reclassification
risk: premium insurance purchased in each period  that pays the consumer the change in the
present discounted value of his future medical expenses at the start of the following period,
equal to X

−(+1){E[ |Λ+1]− E[ |Λ]}
which can potentially yield first-best insurance. In principle, in this manner, first-best
insurance could be provided to the consumer. As Cochrane notes, however, this policy
has the problem that the consumer would have to pay the insurer when the evolution of
his expected future health expenses is better than expected, which may be impossible to
enforce. Cochrane (1995) proposes to solve this problem via health savings accounts that
can be used to receive and make these premium insurance payments. Unfortunately, such
an account can hit a zero balance because a consumer who starts healthy (Λ25 = (1 1)) and
remains healthy (Λ = (1 1) for all   1) would need to make payments in every period.
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(That is, remaining healthy is a better than expected outcome that requires the consumer to
pay the insurance company.)
An alternative approach that one might consider to avoid the need for consumer end-
of-period repayments in the premium insurance scheme would have the consumer pre-pay
the maximal possible repayment at the start of the period as part of his premium. That
is, in each period , the consumer would pay a total premium, including for both medical




−{E[ |Λ]− E[ |Λ+1 = (1 1)]} (29)
and, in addition to coverage of period  medical claims, in each period + 1 (for    ) the




−(+1){E[ |Λ+1]− E[ |Λ]}+
X





−(+1){E[ |Λ+1]− E[ |Λ+1 = (1 1)]} ≥ 0 (30)
equal to the change in expected medical expenses plus the repayment (with interest) of the
second term in (29). Subtracting the period  payment [given by expression (30) modified
to be for period  rather than  + 1] from the period  premium (29), we see that the net
premium payment in each period  for a consumer who begins with Λ25 = (1 1) is exactly
the PKH premium (28). Thus, this approach to premium insurance is exactly equivalent to
a PKH guaranteed renewable contract, and hence would give the insured lower discounted
expected utility than our optimal dynamic contract.
11.1 Empirical Comparison of PKH and Optimal Dynamic Con-
tracts
Using formula (28), we calculate that for our Utah male sample the initial PKH premium
paid by a healthy 25 year old [i.e., a consumer with Λ25 = (1 1)] is about 3.2% higher than
the initial premium paid by a healthy 25 year old individual with flat net income in the
optimal dynamic contract.58 For a consumer who arrives at age 25 in the healthiest state
and who has a flat net income profile, the excessively low initial consumption required to
eliminate all reclassification risk translates into a lower welfare:  = $54 834, which
58At age 25 the value of the second term in equation (28), representing the premium pre-payment that
is required in the PKH contract, is $1,530. This amount divided by  (= 0975) is also the end-of-period
amount that the consumer would need to pay out in the event that she remained healthy (with Λ26 = (1 1))
to achieve the first best in the reclassification-risk insurance scheme proposed by Cochrane (1995).
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is 0.4% lower than the certainty equivalent that this consumer would have with an optimal
dynamic contract. As a result, the PKH contract eliminates 97.2% of the welfare loss from
reclassification, compared to the 99.4% from an optimal dynamic contract. The welfare loss
from the PKH contract relative to an optimal contract increases with rising income profiles:
For example, for a healthy 25 year old downscaled manager we find that  = $37 819,
resulting in a loss of 2.4% compared to an optimal dynamic contract; the PKH contract
therefore eliminates only 84.2% of the welfare loss due to reclassification risk, compared
to the 94.3% from an optimal dynamic contract. For a non-manager  = $47 525,
which represents a 1.5% welfare loss and an elimination of 80.1% of the welfare loss from
reclassifcation risk, compared to 95.1% from an optimal contract.59
59While the PKH contract assumes that the consumer arrives at age 25 in the healthiest state, as we have
seen, not all consumers manage to do so. We expect that the excessive front-loading involved in contracts
that would eliminate al reclassification risk would be more costly for such consumers.
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